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A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCOVERING IMPLICIT
BIAS
Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen*

Actors’ implicit biases impact the law in areas ranging from
employment discrimination to criminal law. Legal scholars are
rightly concerned with the effects of implicit bias and have suggested
a myriad of ways to counteract it. Many employment discrimination
scholars, however, are pessimistic about the current law’s potential to
curtail the effect of implicit bias. Very little has been written about
how the actual framework of an employment discrimination suit can
mitigate bias. This Article fills that gap by suggesting a framework
and exploring the importance of the framework at the summary
judgment stage of litigation. This Article examines the way in which
the framework courts use in individual disparate treatment
employment discrimination cases can work indirectly to force
employers to reflect upon their motives for a particular decision. It
advocates using the motivating factor framework at the summary
judgment phase, which will ultimately change employers’ decisionmaking behavior. Through a review of social psychology literature on
decision-making and implicit bias, as well as a comparative case
analysis of the differing frameworks used to analyze individual
disparate treatment cases, it demonstrates the power that the
motivating factor framework holds to indirectly mitigate the effects of
implicit bias in workplace decisions.

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law. I would like to
thank Adam Benforado, David Cohen, Dan Filler, Richard Frankel, Alex Geisinger, Christine Jolls, the
members of the Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law Junior Faculty Group, the participants on
the Implicit Bias panel of the Law and Society Conference and the participants in the Seton Hall Fourth
Annual Labor and Employment Colloquium for their very helpful comments. I am also grateful to
Lindsay Wagner and July Simpson for their excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in social psychological research have determined
that people act upon implicit biases of which they are not aware. When
employers act on these biases, employees suffer. However, if the biases
are implicit, how can the law address them? Scholars have suggested a
myriad of ways to counteract such biases in the employment
discrimination context. Unfortunately, there has been little written about
how the actual framework of an individual disparate treatment case can
work in an indirect way to force self-reflection and, thus, recognition of
such biases. This Article attempts to fill that void by suggesting a
framework for evaluating such claims that forces employers to reflect
upon their motives for a particular decision and, hopefully, change
employer’s behavior.
As an example consider, Todd White, an African-American male,
who in January 2001 was enjoying success as a valued employee of
Baxter Healthcare Corporation. 1 He was employed by the company and
its predecessor, Ohmeda Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., for several years
as a sales representative selling proprietary and generic pharmaceutical
products and was recently promoted to the position of Teaching Center
Specialist. 2 The previous year White was awarded membership in the
company’s Distinguished Sales Club, an honor reserved for the top 5%
of Baxter’s sales representatives. 3 Until January 2004, Richard Clark
1. The introductory narrative is based on White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2380 (2009).
2. Id. at 385.
3. Id.
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was White’s supervisor and White’s performance reviews were quite
strong. 4 For example, in his 2003 performance review, Clark raved, “I
could not be happier with your results YTD . . . I know that you will
finish the year at #1!” 5
Just two months after this review, White was required to report to a
different supervisor, Tim Phillips. 6 White soon began to notice signs
that Phillips perhaps harbored discriminatory animus towards AfricanAmerican employees. 7 For instance, Phillips would occasionally answer
White’s phone calls by saying, “White, Todd” instead of just calling him
by his first name as was customary. 8 Additionally, Phillips commented
on several occasions that “nobody wants to be around a black man” and
referred to a female African-American employee as “that black girl,”
rather than referring to her by her name. 9
Despite these subtle (or perhaps not so subtle) signs of prejudice,
Phillips encouraged White to apply for the position of Midwest Regional
manager within his division at Baxter. 10 White applied but did not
receive the promotion. According to the panel of decision-makers,
which did not include Phillips, White appeared “extremely aggressive”
and “confrontational” in the interview. 11 The panel gave the job to a
woman with fewer credentials than White including less managerial
experience and no MBA. 12
In addition to not receiving the promotion, White’s 2004 performance
evaluation, authored by Phillips, was considerably less favorable than
the one he had received from his previous supervisor only a year
earlier. 13 According to Phillips, White’s quantitative sales results were
very poor and actually merited a lower rating than he gave White, but
Phillips increased his performance score due to White’s dedication and
commitment to the business. Even with this enhanced score, White did
not receive as large of a pay increase as he believed he deserved. 14
White’s situation is not uncommon. How often are personal
characteristics, specifically those that are irrelevant, used by another to
make judgments? Research on cognitive development is replete with
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 385–86.
Id. at 386 n.2.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 386.
Id.at 387–88.
Id. at 388–89.
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evidence that humans learn to categorize at an early age and part of this
categorization process can lead us to rely on stereotypes in decisionmaking as a heuristic device. 15 The question, then, is not whether this
process occurs, but rather what society can do about it. Specifically,
what should antidiscrimination laws do to counter the use of stereotypes
in decision-making processes? The question is complicated by the
introduction of additional research showing that many of these
stereotypes are automatic and are not consciously activated by a
decision-maker. Rather, they operate on an unconscious level such that
an individual confronted with a choice between two job seekers, for
example, may prefer the Caucasian applicant to the African-American
applicant for reasons wholly unrelated to merit but not understand what
these reasons are. 16 Much has been written about what role the law
should play in ferreting out and eliminating implicit bias. 17 This was, in
part, the issue confronted by the Sixth Circuit in the White case.
After his poor performance review, White filed a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and eventually filed suit
alleging discrimination on the basis of gender and race in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. 18 All of his claims were
dismissed on summary judgment, and on appeal, White contested the
dismissal of his race discrimination claims in relation to Baxter’s failure
to promote him and his poor performance evaluation. 19
One issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
15. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (discussing the rapid and
automatic categorizations underlying stereotypes); Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental
Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116
PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 126–27 (1994) (“People immediately place the things they encounter into
preexisting knowledge structures of schemata. . . . Although there is some controversy over the exact
nature of the categorization process, there is widespread agreement that humans are prone to quick
categorization of their environment.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1187–88 (1995) (discussing the notion that people categorize information as they receive it as part
of the central premise of social cognition theory).
16. See infra notes 30 and 250 (and accompanying text) describing this research.
17. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969,
980–81 (2006) (arguing that affirmative action can decrease implicit bias simply by increasing the level
of diversity in the workplace); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1053,
1058 (2006) (criticizing courts’ use of the honest belief rule and same actor rule because the
psychological theories underpinning these rules are not aligned with how people actually behave. The
author argues that these rules reflect a view of discrimination as purposeful and deliberate, while social
science research has shown that many stereotypes operate at an unconscious level.).
18. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2380 (2009).
19. Id.
OF
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Circuit was how to assess White’s claim that his race, while perhaps not
entirely responsible for Phillip’s poor evaluation, at least played a part in
the evaluation. The court noted that this issue was one that confronted
federal courts around the country since 2003 when the Supreme Court
decided Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. 20 In that decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that direct evidence was not required to establish a “mixed
motive” claim under Title VII. 21 Rather, relying on circumstantial
evidence alone, a plaintiff could allege that race or some other
prohibited category played a role in the employment decision. 22 The
Sixth Circuit correctly noted that the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
rejected the application of Desert Palace and the motivating factor
framework at the summary judgment phase and, instead, retained the
standard test articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 23 This
test requires the plaintiff to proffer evidence that could be used to infer
that discrimination was the sole reason, not one of the reasons, for the
adverse employment decision.
The Sixth Circuit in White declined to take that approach, 24 and
joined the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits in permitting a mixed-motive
plaintiff to avoid a defendant’s motion for summary judgment by
producing evidence that a forbidden characteristic at least played a role
in the decision. 25 The court noted, “[t]his burden of producing some
evidence in support of a mixed motive claim is not onerous and should
preclude sending the case to the jury only where the record is devoid of
evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff’s
claim.” 26 This decision is a step towards rooting out implicit bias
because it allows a plaintiff to articulate a mixed motive case—and
support it with rather minimal evidence—by demonstrating that a
forbidden characteristic played a role in the decision at least at the

20. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
21. Id. at 92.
22. Id. at 99, 101–02.
23. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004);
Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004).
24. White, 533 F.3d at 400 (“We do so by holding that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burdenshifting framework does not apply to the summary judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive
claims.”).
25. At the summary judgment stage, the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have stated that a
plaintiff may prevail by either providing evidence that a defendant’s articulated legitimate reason is
pretextual or by providing evidence that—in addition to legitimate reasons—defendant’s actions were
also motivated by illegitimate (i.e., discriminatory) reasons. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005); see also, Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305,
312–13 (5th Cir. 2004); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008).
26. White, 533 F.3d at 400.
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summary judgment stage. Law directly influences the decision-maker
by recognizing that bad motives can sometimes be mixed with legitimate
motives and that legitimate motives should not be permitted to simply
mask the illegitimate motives as happens under the McDonnell Douglas
framework. However, the direct potential of the motivating factor
framework is not the focus of this Article. Courts are still reticent to
attempt to get inside decision-maker’s heads to figure out the rationale
behind their decisions. Instead, courts, even under the motivating
framework analysis, will often still look to some explicit evidence of
bias either on the part of the decision-maker, other supervisors or the
company in general.
This Article argues that the law in circuits, which recognize the
motivating factor framework at summary judgment, may actually have a
greater, though more indirect, effect on the implicit biases of decisionmakers. If as the Sixth Circuit articulated, the burden that must be
satisfied by plaintiffs to make it past summary judgment is low then
employers will become more concerned with the potential for suit when
making employment decisions. Specifically, employers, as encouraged
by their counsel, will be forced to think about their real motives for
making a decision. Psychological research has shown that increased
attention to decision-making reasons can have a positive effect on the
recognition that automatic stereotypes may be playing a role in a
particular decision. 27 Therefore, forcing employers to pay more
attention to the reasons behind their employment decisions, in order to
avoid a law suit that may survive a summary judgment motion, is a
promising step in rooting out implicit bias.
This Article examines how the framework used by courts in
individual, disparate treatment employment discrimination cases can
work indirectly to force employers to reflect upon their motives for a
particular decision. 28
It advocates using the motivating factor
27. See, e.g., Wilson & Brekke, supra note 15, at 133 (“There is considerable evidence, then, that
forewarning and debiasing manipulations are most likely to work when . . . [t]hey make people aware of
the unwanted processing, they motivate people to resist it, and people are aware of the direction and
magnitude of the bias and have sufficient control over their responses to correct for it.”); Irene V. Blair,
The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242,
247 (2002) (concluding that “highly motivated individuals can modify the automatic operation of
stereotypes and prejudice”).
28. This Article focuses primarily on race and gender discrimination as prohibited by Title VII.
The theory behind the paper’s hypothesis could work equally well in other contexts, including age
discrimination. However, the Supreme Court recently decided that the motivating factor analysis is not
available for age discrimination claims brought pursuant to the ADEA because the ADEA, unlike Title
VII, was not amended to reflect such a framework. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349
(2009). Thus, although such an extension to age cases might be theoretically desirable, the Court has
deemed it legally impossible, at least for the time being.
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framework at the summary judgment phase; using this analysis will
ultimately change employers’ behavior. Although judges are hesitant to
attempt to detect employers’ implicit biases, through the use of the
motivating factor framework, judges can encourage an employer to selfreflect when making employment decisions. As discussed infra, being
motivated to undertake such self-reflection can help detect implicit bias
by the decision-maker himself. The motivating factor framework will
not empower judges to detect implicit bias in any given case; the
framework will encourage decision-makers to reflect on all of their
reasons for making an employment decision. This self-reflection will
lead to greater detection of implicit biases by the decision-maker herself.
Part II discusses the issue of implicit discrimination and the insights
cognitive psychology has had in this area. It also examines some of the
legal fields that scholars feel are particularly vulnerable to implicit bias
and makes some suggestions for dealing with such bias in these areas.
Part III considers implicit bias in the employment context, and why the
case law under Title VII has historically proven inadequate to combat
such bias. It then relates other scholars’ proposals for combating
implicit discrimination. Next, Part III examines Desert Palace’s
potential for combating implicit bias. Part IV discusses why using the
motivating factor framework at the summary judgment stage is so
crucial in employment discrimination cases. Part V analyzes how courts
in two different circuits (the Eighth and the Ninth) are using the Desert
Palace decision in completely different ways. The matched case
analysis supports the proposition that seems obvious and yet has gone
untested: the differing standards at summary judgment lead to different
outcomes in these circuits. Part V argues that these differences will
affect how well implicit bias is detected by the employment decisionmaker himself in these circuits. Finally, Part VI sets forth an argument
for why a more liberal interpretation of Desert Palace’s effect on the
Title VII case law at summary judgment will lead to greater recognition
of implicit biases by the employers themselves, which should lead to a
decrease in the role that implicit bias plays in employment decisions. In
sum, this Article demonstrates that Title VII can combat implicit bias,
though more indirectly than has been proposed by most scholars.
II. THE PROBLEM OF IMPLICIT BIAS
A. Implicit Bias in General
In his seminal article, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection:
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Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 29 Charles Lawrence argued:
Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about
racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be
characterized as neither intentional—in the sense that certain outcomes
are self-consciously sought—nor unintentional—in the sense that the
outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the
decisionmaker’s beliefs, desires, and wishes.
....
. . . To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced us all,
we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our
racism. 30

Legal scholars often refer to such innate prejudice as “implicit
bias.” 31 They use this term to encapsulate the notion that everyone
holds certain biases at an unconscious level, and these biases may
influence our decision-making processes in ways of which we are
completely unaware. 32 The notion of implicit bias is rooted in
psychological research about human cognitive processes. Research in
cognitive psychology shows that, from a very early age, humans are
taught to categorize the world. Categorization allows humans to make
sense of the new information they encounter each day.33 For instance,
children are taught the difference between colors, shapes, and sizes.
This process continues as they grow, leading to more and more specific
categories. A two year old may know the difference between a car and a
boat, but a five year old will likely know the difference between certain
types of cars (e.g., station wagon, sedan, SUV, etc.). This process of
more sophisticated categorization continues with age. The eight year
old may recognize that his parents have a Ford, whereas the sixteen year
old will know the difference between the Mustang and its less
impressive relative the Focus.
This mental categorization process occurs in various aspects of
29. Charles L. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
30. Id. at 322.
31. See, e.g., Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, Michelle Obama: A Contemporary
Analysis of Race and Gender Discrimination Through the Lens of Title VII, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
3, 20 (2009); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 364–373 (2007).
32. Krieger, supra note 15, at 1169, 1188, 1207, 1216–17.
33. Id. at 1189–91.
See also Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal
Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental
Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329, 338 (1992) (“When faced with data and the need to make
judgments derived from that data, all humans may be categorized as ‘intuitive scientists.’ Information is
processed through beliefs, theories, propositions, and schemas. These knowledge structures enable us to
label and categorize objects rapidly and, in most cases, correctly.”).
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human life, including in grouping of individuals encountered on a daily
basis. According to psychologists, such categorization allows for more
efficient processing of information, judgment-making, 34 and can also be
“socially useful [by] help[ing] people interact more easily.” 35 This
categorization process can result in stereotypes. Despite the time-saving
benefits of categorization, the process can become a problem when these
categories turn into stereotypes of which an individual may not be
aware. 36
Although stereotyping is really just another form of
categorization, 37 once in place, these stereotypes may “contaminate” our
intergroup decision-making with biases of which we are not aware. 38
Krieger has offered a useful and concise summary of social cognition
theory’s explication of the process whereby stereotypes can contaminate
our mental processes:
[O]nce in place, stereotypes bias intergroup judgment and
decisionmaking. According to this view, stereotypes operate as “person
prototypes” or “social schemas.” As such, they function as implicit
theories, biasing in predictable ways the perception, interpretation,
encoding, retention, and recall of information about other people.
. . . Stereotypes, when they function as implicit prototypes or schemas,
operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness. Empirical
evidence indicates that people’s access to their own cognitive processes is
in fact poor. Accordingly, cognitive bias may well be both unintentional
and unconscious. 39

One way in which the manifestation of these automatic stereotypes
has been tested is through the development of the Implicit Association
Test (IAT). This test, developed by Project Implicit, seeks to “examine
thoughts and feelings that exist either outside of conscious awareness or
outside of conscious control.” 40 It does so by presenting subjects with a
34. See Blair, supra note 27, at 242; Fiske, supra note 15, at 367 (noting that studies have shown
the “cognitive economy of stereotypes,” such that “stereotype labels—such as doctor, artist, skinhead, or
real estate agent—saved resources in an impression formation task”).
35. Fiske, supra note 15, at 375.
36. Krieger, supra note 15, at 1187 (noting “that cognitive structures and processes involved in
categorization and information processing can in and of themselves result in stereotyping and other
forms of biased intergroup judgment previously attributed to motivational processes”). See also Jody
Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break The Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 733, 733–34 (1995) (defining stereotypes as “well-learned internal associations about social
groups that are governed by automatic cognitive processes.” The author contrasts this with prejudice,
which he defines as “a set of conscious personal beliefs.”).
37. Krieger, supra note 15, at 1187.
38. Id. at 1188. See also Wilson & Brekke, supra note 15, at 118–19 (recognizing mental bias as
a type of “mental contamination” whereby “a person ends with an unwanted judgment, emotion or
behavior because of mental processing that is unconscious or uncontrollable”).
39. Krieger, supra note 15, at 1188.
40. See Project Implicit, Background Information, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
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series of words and asking subjects to categorize certain words or
pictures into groups. For example, subjects participating in the race IAT
are asked to associate pleasant words with European Americans and
unpleasant words with African-Americans. They are then asked to do
the reverse. An implicit bias against African-Americans is revealed
when the subject is faster at associating African-Americans with
unpleasant words and European Americans with pleasant words. “The
IAT is rooted in the very simple hypothesis that people will find it easier
to associate pleasant words with white faces and names than AfricanAmerican faces and names—and that the same pattern will be found for
other traditionally disadvantaged groups.” 41 As Greenwald and Krieger
have noted, over many different categories, “[t]he bias index’s values for
IAT measures revealed considerably higher values than for the selfreport measures, indicating that implicit bias is far more pervasive than
explicit bias.” 42
The operation of implicit biases has been tested in other ways.
Researches often perform audit studies where an African-American and
a Caucasian employee are sent into a job interview. Though both have
nearly the same qualifications for the job, the testers seek to determine
whether one racial group of interviewees is consistently selected over
another group. The problem with these studies is the variability in the
actual interaction between the employer and the candidates, which may
account for some of the variation in results. To eliminate this
variability, Bertand and Mulainathan conducted a field study in which
they sent resumes with identical qualifications to employers in the
Chicago and Boston areas. Some resumes had traditionally Caucasiansounding names, while others were for candidates with traditionally
African-American names. The authors found that the callback rate for
the African-American resumes was significantly lower than the rate for
Caucasian candidates, despite the nearly identical qualifications. 43
backgroundinformation.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
41. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 971.
42. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CAL. L. REV. 945, 957 (2006). There is currently a scholarly debate on the merits of the IAT. See
Gregory Mitchell & Philip Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1023 (2006); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 737 (2009) (questioning whether the delays reported on the IAT actually translate into
“realistic settings”). But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination
Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y. REV. 477, 480–81 (2007) (arguing that Mitchell and Tetlock’s real target is
“the normative view of antidiscrimination law as reaching beyond acts reflecting the individual fault of
the discriminator”).
43. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mulainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, (MIT Dept. of Econ.,
Working Paper No. W9873, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/3

10

Bucciarelli Pedersen: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCOVERING IMPLICIT BIAS
PEDERSEN FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 3:45:55 PM

UNCOVERING IMPLICIT BIAS

107

Although this field study indicates that signals sent by names played a
role in employers’ interviewing decisions, there is a possibility that race
and, specifically, implicit racial bias may not motivate the findings. For
instance, it is possible that socioeconomic status could be playing a role
in the findings. Nonetheless, laboratory studies indicate implicit bias’s
importance as a causal factor in decision-making.
In another study, subjects acted as a parole board and decided whether
an individual was still a menace to society. The subjects were presented
with background information about the person and his or her crime.
Researchers found that subjects were generally more punitive to an
individual with a Hispanic name than an individual with a Caucasian
name. 44 The authors concluded that “[t]ransgressions that are consistent
with a cultural stereotype of the transgressor appear to be attributed to
stable dispositional factors rather than to transitory or unstable ones.” 45
B. Implicit Bias and the Law
The effects of implicit bias on a decision-maker’s behavior concern
legal scholars. Authors have written about implicit bias in a range of
areas from criminal law 46 to communications law. 47 Those studying the
criminal justice system, the jury selection system, and employment
law 48 in particular are acutely concerned with the consequences of
decision-makers’ implicit biases.
In criminal law, implicit bias is a great concern. One area of study
involves a police officer’s decision whether to shoot a potential criminal
encountered on the street. Studies have shown that “[p]olice officers not
only viewed more Black faces than White faces as criminal, they viewed
those Black faces rated as most stereotypically or prototypically
_id=428367. Additionally, a recent study bolsters the gap between individual’s explicit and implicit
biases. The study found that “racism may persevere in part because people who anticipate feeling upset
and believe that they will take action may actually respond with indifference when faced with an act of
racism.” Kerry Kawakami et al., Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral Responses to Racism, 323 SCI.
276 (2009).
44. Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of Stereotypes on Decision Making and
Information-Processing Strategies, 48 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 267 (1985).
45. Id. at 279.
46. See R. Richard Banks et al., Race, Crime, and Antidiscrimination, in BEYOND COMMON
SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
47. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2004).
48. See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman & Michelle Haynes, Subjectivity in the Appraisal Process: A
Facilitator of Gender Bias in Work Settings, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN
THE COURTROOM 127 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008); Christine Jolls,
Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on Implicit Bias in 3 NYU SELECTED ESSAYS ON LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 69 (Mitu Gulati &
Michael Yelnosky eds., 2007).
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Black . . . as the most criminal of all.” 49 Additionally, the so-called
“shooting studies” have found that “racial stereotypes create associations
and expectations that may play a role in the sort of split-second
decisions that may literally be a matter of life or death for police officers
and suspects alike.” 50 As Jerry Kang summarizes:
Charles Judd and his colleagues performed a . . . study in 2004 to
identify what types of racial meanings generate the shooter bias —
negative emotional affect (negatively valenced evaluations of Blacks),
cognitive stereotype (linking Blacks to guns), or some combination
(stereotyping associated with a particular evaluative valence).
Participants were primed with a Black or White face. The subsequent
task involved categorizing a photograph as a handgun or insect. While
both categories are negatively valenced, only the first category is
stereotypically associated with Blacks.
Researchers next asked
participants to categorize objects as either sports equipment or fruits.
Both categories are positively valenced, but only the first category is
stereotypically associated with Blacks. If (negative) prejudice were the
sole source of the shooter bias, then we would expect to see no facilitation
in categorizing sports equipment after a Black prime. By contrast, if
stereotypes were the sole cause, then we would expect to see facilitation
with both guns and sports equipment and no facilitation with insects or
fruits.
Consistent with [prior studies] the experimenters discovered that
participants categorized guns faster when primed with a Black face. They
also found, however, faster categorization of sports equipment when
primed with a Black face . . . Accordingly, the researchers concluded that
stereotypes, rather than prejudice, best explain the shooter bias results. 51

Interestingly, an individual police officer’s association between
Afrocentric features and harshness of treatment was not statistically
related to such an individual’s explicit racial attitude. 52 Automatic
stereotypes, or unconscious bias, seem to play a role in an officer’s
decision for treatment of a potentially armed suspect.
Criminal law must confront the issue of how African-American and
Caucasian defendants are treated in the courtroom. Studies have shown
that the race of the accused and the victim affect the treatment of the
defendant. However, the race of the victim really seems to determine
the punishment. That is, studies have shown that “killing a white person
is more likely to result in a death sentence than killing a Black

49.
50.
51.
52.

See Banks et al., supra note 46, at 5.
Id. at 7.
Kang, supra note 47, at 1527–28.
Banks et al., supra note 46, at 8.
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person.” 53 This issue was the subject of McCleskey v. Kemp, 54 where,
the United States Supreme Court considered whether the imposition of
the death penalty in Georgia was discriminatory. The Court examined,
among other evidence, the “Baldus” study. This study included an
analysis of more than four hundred variables in over one thousand
Georgia homicide cases. Ultimately, the authors concluded that only
race could explain the difference in punishment imposed on defendants
who killed Caucasian victims. 55 Moreover, the authors concluded that,
for at least a subset of cases, African-Americans who killed Caucasians
were more likely to be sentenced to death than Caucasians who killed
other Caucasians. 56
As Jerry Kang summarizes, recent neurological studies have
demonstrated that, when studied by functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI):
[T]he amygdalas [that portion of the brain associated with the fear
response] of White [study] participants ‘light up’ far more when they are
subliminally shown Black faces as compared to White faces. Moreover,
the degree of amygdala activation is significantly correlated with
participants’ IAT scores. There is, however, no correlation with explicit
measures of bias, which again demonstrates dissociation between explicit
self-reports and implicit measures revealed by reaction-time
differentials. 57

Such studies create concern about the likelihood that an AfricanAmerican suspect will be treated fairly by an arresting officer and that
an African-American criminal defendant can be treated fairly by judges
and jurors, at least by Caucasian judges and jurors, when brought to
trial. For, if Caucasian jurors, or at least most Caucasian jurors, are
neurologically predisposed to fear African-American defendants more
than Caucasian defendants, we can expect the presumption of guilt for
an African-American defendant to be greater than that for a Caucasian
defendant before the trial even begins.
The implicit bias of individual jurors is not the only concern in the
trial process. Scholars have also expressed concern about the operation
of attorneys’ unconscious bias during the jury selection process. More
specifically, the use of peremptory challenges has been targeted as a

53. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel Gross, Social Science and the Evolving Standards of Death
Penalty Law, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 251 (Eugene
Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
54. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
55. Id. at 356 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 53, at 251.
56. Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 53, at 251.
57. Kang, supra note 47, at 1511.
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likely product for the operation of implicit bias. 58 As Antony Page
stated, “At best, a peremptory challenge is an educated guess, whereas at
worst it is merely the expression of naked prejudice.” 59 While some of
this prejudice may be explicit, much is likely to be unconscious and
operate outside of the awareness of the striking attorney. 60 Generally,
when an attorney exercises a peremptory challenge, the attorney merely
states his reason for striking the jury, and a judge must decide whether
this seems plausible. Much like the McDonnell Douglas framework
used in employment cases, the Batson framework operates on the
assumption that the striking attorney has only one reason for the strike
and is aware of this reason. As Antony Page notes, this is unrealistic in
light of existing cognitive research on stereotypes. Therefore, he
suggests that since the peremptory challenge likely will not be
eliminated in the near future, the best remedy for prevention of the
operation of implicit bias during the use of a peremptory challenge is not
a change in law, but rather in procedure used by judges. Page
elaborates:
[T]here are more moderate steps that attorneys and judges should take to
reduce the problem [of the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges].
These steps include judicial warnings about unconscious stereotyping
before jury selection, enhancing voir dire through the use of race- and
gender- blind questionnaires, and expanding the time allowed for voir
dire. Although much bias is automatic, unconscious and unintentional,
unconscious bias can be reduced both by raising the visibility of our
society’s egalitarian norms and by increasing the amount of information
about potential jurors available to litigants. 61

These examples are just a sample of the legal areas that may be
affected by implicit bias. Obviously, the possibility that automatic
stereotypes may affect an individual’s decisions without his knowledge
has implications for many other areas of the law as well. This Article
focuses on the possible implications in the employment context—
particularly in race and gender intentional discrimination cases.
For example, in one series of experiments:
Michael Norton and his colleagues demonstrated [the effect of implicit
bias] in simulated hiring and higher-education admissions decisions.
They showed that subjects consistently altered the qualifications they
deemed most relevant to the selection of a high-level construction
58. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005).
59. Id. at 158.
60. Id. at 159.
61. Id. at 161.
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manager, a stereotypically male job. When the male candidate had more
education and less relevant job experience, subjects—who
overwhelmingly preferred the male candidate—reported that they viewed
education as more important than job experience. When the male
candidate had more job experience and less education than the female
candidate, subjects ranked job experience as more important than
education. Either way, subjects tended to rank the criteria in a way that
would justify selection of the male candidate on the grounds that he was
‘better qualified’ than the female candidate they were rejecting.
However, when subjects were forced to rank the selection criteria before
seeing the candidates’ resumes, gender bias in selection largely
disappeared. 62

To illustrate the extent of the problem in the employment context,
recall the conclusion of the parole board study discussed in Part II.A
supra, that “[t]ransgressions that are consistent with a cultural stereotype
of the transgressor appear to be attributed to stable dispositional factors
rather than to transitory or unstable ones.” 63 This conclusion has
important implications for the employment context. If a manager must
decide whether an employee should be fired due to a verbal altercation
with a co-worker, for example, the manager may be influenced by his or
her automatic stereotypes in making a decision—the manager will likely
conclude that the employee whose race is perceived to be consisted with
being “a trouble-maker” is consistent with that stereotype and should be
fired. On the other hand, the manager may find that a person who that
manager does not stereotypically group as a trouble-maker was really
just acting uncharacteristically in the instance and so should be given
another chance. Note that in this situation, nothing about the individual
has been varied except his or her congruence with the manager’s
stereotyped beliefs. In the corporate world, where many managers are
non-minorities, such practices could have devastating implications for
minority employees.
With the increased understanding of implicit bias and its prevalence
came an increased concern on the part of discrimination scholars about
the ability of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to counteract such
unconsciously held stereotypes. The next Part discusses some of the
scholarship focusing on why Title VII, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court and various circuit courts, is unable to confront and curtail
implicit bias. The Part then discusses how Title VII could more
effectively counteract such bias.

62. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, at 1037 (citing Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social
Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 821–22 (2004)).
63. Bodenhauser & Wyer, supra note 44, at 279.
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III. TITLE VII AND IMPLICIT BIAS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part
that:
it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail, or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 64

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court laid out a
framework to be used when an individual plaintiff brings an
employment discrimination case alleging intentional discrimination
based on circumstantial evidence. First, the plaintiff must make out a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) the plaintiff belongs
to a group protected under the statute; (2) the plaintiff applied for and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(3) that, notwithstanding, his qualifications, he was rejected, and (4)
after his rejection, the position remained open, and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff’s qualifications. 65
If the plaintiff does this, the burden of production then shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. 66 If the defendant meets this burden, the
burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff and merges with the
burden of persuasion, requiring plaintiff to prove that defendant’s
articulated reason is pretextual. 67 As noted by the Supreme Court, the
burden on the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case and on the defendant
to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is not onerous.68
Thus, the majority of individual disparate treatment cases decided under
the McDonnell Douglas framework are decided on the pretext prong. In
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
65. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Courts have modified this
four-part prima facie case in circumstances not involving hiring decisions. The more general
formulation now used by many courts adapts the second and third prong to the nature of the adverse
decision and replaces the fourth prong with the requirement that the adverse employment action
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See, e.g., EEOC v. PVNF,
L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007) (discriminatory failure to promote, demotion, and
constructive discharge); Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1055 (8th Cir.
2007) (discriminatory discipline and constructive discharge); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d
211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005) (discriminatory termination); Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d
645, 649–50 (4th Cir. 2002) (discriminatory training); Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, 292
F.3d 654, 659–60 (9th Cir. 2002) (discriminatory termination).
66. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
67. Id. at 804.
68. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
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subsequent cases, the Court made clear that a plaintiff, simply by
showing pretext, is not automatically entitled to a favorable judgment
because plaintiffs must convince the factfinder not only that the
employer’s proffered reason is pretext, but also that the real reason is
discrimination. 69
The McDonnell Douglas pretext framework is a source of great
contention among scholars concerned with targeting implicit bias under
Title VII. 70 Scholars have noted that the McDonnell Douglas pretext
model is based upon an assumption that an employer only has one
motive for making a hiring decision and that that motive is transparently
clear to the employer at the time the decision is made. 71 As discussed in
69. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993) (“It is not enough, in other words,
to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional
discrimination.” (emphasis added)). See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147
(2000) (emphasizing that the factfinder’s disbelief of defendant’s proffered reason does not
automatically compel judgment for the plaintiff; but “’the factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put
forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.’” (quoting
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511)).
70. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem for a Heavyweight: Costa as Countermonument to
McDonnell Douglas – A Countermemory Reply to Instrumentalism, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965, 986 (2004)
(“’That is, the problem is not simply that courts do not understand unconscious bias or that judges
themselves are hopelessly unconsciously biased. Rather, many judges quite consciously and
deliberately believe that, even under Title VII, they should not interrogate the practices of the private
workplace without direct evidence of mendacity.’” (quoting Chad Derum & Kren Engel, The Rise of the
Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1177, 1192–93 (2003))); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 750 (2005) (noting that an alleged “discriminator’s awareness of
her motivations is not a necessary element of a Title VII claim”); T.L. Nagy, The Fall of the False
Dichotomy: The Effect of Desert Palace v. Costa on Summary Judgment in Title VII Discrimination
Cases, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 137, 150 (2004); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An
Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 107 (2003)
[hereinafter Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort]; Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment Law (Really),
59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 655 (2008); Krieger, supra note 15, at 1163–64; David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 900 (1993); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional
Discrimination: The Reality of the Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 284 (1997) (arguing that
despite the Supreme Court’s rhetoric concerning the importance of ferreting out unconscious or subtle
discrimination, the Court, over the past twenty years, “has only seen discrimination, absent a facial
classification, in the most overt or obvious situations—situations that could not be explained on any
basis other than race”); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, 1057–58.
71. See Hart, supra note 70, at 746, 758 (“By focusing the legal inquiry on the employer’s intent
at the moment an employment decision is made, the law fails to recognize that discrimination ‘can
intrude much earlier, as cognitive process-based errors in perception and judgment subtly distort the
ostensibly objective data set upon which a decision is ultimately based.’ . . . [C]ourts applying the
McDonnell-Douglas framework mistakenly assume that employment decisions are motivated by a single
factor—either honest business judgment or dishonest discriminatory motivation.” (quoting Krieger,
supra note 15, at 1212)); see also Nagy, supra note 70, at 150 (“The dichotomy produced by the
McDonnell Douglas framework is a false one. In practice, few employment decisions are made solely
on the basis of one rationale to the exclusion of all others. Instead, most employment decisions are the
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Part II, supra, however, many biases are held unconsciously and are
perhaps not able to be easily detected by the employer at the time an
employment decision is made. Thus, if courts force plaintiffs to prove
that discrimination is the sole reason for an adverse employment
decision under McDonnell Douglas, they are interpreting Title VII too
narrowly and in a way that is out of touch with the behavioral realities of
the actors Title VII targets. As Krieger and Fiske have argued,
“resulting inconsistencies between the real world and the
phenomenological models embedded in law can be highly
problematic.” 72 The need for congruence between the realities of how
legal decision-makers act and the way in which the law assumes they act
is a fundamental tenant behind the Behavioral Realist movement. 73
Krieger and Fiske further point out,
[i]n the context of antidiscrimination law, behavioral realism stands for
the proposition that judicial models—of what discrimination is, what
causes it to occur, how it can be prevented, and how its presence or
absence can best be discerned in particular cases—should be periodically
revisited and adjusted so as to remain continuous with progress in
psychological science. 74

Given the apparent disconnect between the McDonnell Douglas sole
factor theory of discrimination and the psychological developments
highlighting the prevalence of implicit bias, it becomes apparent that
intentional individual disparate treatment law must evolve in order to
stay true to the realities of the employment decision-making process. It

result of the interaction of various factors, legitimate, and at times illegitimate, objective and subjective,
rational and irrational.” (quoting Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn.
2003))); Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort, supra note 70, at 108 (noting that by focusing on the conscious
intent of employers at the moment the employment decision is made, “the McDonnell Douglas
approach asks the wrong question” (emphasis added)); Katz, supra note 70, at 655 (discussing why it is
problematic to put the burden, as the McDonnell Douglas framework does, on plaintiffs to prove but-for
causation in individual disparate treatment cases); Krieger, supra note 15, at 1164 (discussing the
inadequacy of current Title VII jurisprudence in addressing the “subtle, often unconscious forms of bias
that Title VII was also intended to remedy”); Oppenheimer, supra note 70, at 900 (advocating for a
negligence standard for employment discrimination cases, such that an employer could be held liable for
discrimination “when the employer fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination that it
knows or should know is occurring, or that it expects or should expect to occur . . . [or] when it fails to
conform its conduct to the statutorily established standard of care by making employment decisions that
have a discriminatory effect, without first carefully examining its processes, searching for less
discriminatory alternatives, and examining its own motives for evidence of stereotyping”); Krieger &
Fiske, supra note 17, at 1028 (“In numerous ways, antidiscrimination law reflects and reifies a commonsense theory of social perception and judgment that attributes disparate treatment discrimination to the
deliberate, conscious, and intentional actions of invidiously motivated actors.”).
72. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, at 999.
73. Id. at 1000.
74. Id. at 1001.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/3

18

Bucciarelli Pedersen: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCOVERING IMPLICIT BIAS
PEDERSEN FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 3:45:55 PM

UNCOVERING IMPLICIT BIAS

115

is no longer sufficient to understand discrimination only as a product of
an explicit bias that is well-recognized and understood by a decisionmaker at the time a decision is made. Rather, the law must account for
the fact that many employment decisions are based on reasons of which
the employer may not have a conscious recognition.
To its credit, the Supreme Court made a foray into this area by
recognizing that not all decisions are based on one factor. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 75 the Court stated:
Moreover, since we know that the words “because of” do not mean
“solely because of,” we also know that Title VII meant to condemn even
those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
considerations. When, therefore, an employer considers both gender and
legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was
“because of” sex and the other, legitimate considerations—even if we
may say later, in the context of litigation, that the decision would have
been the same if gender had not been taken into account. 76

Thus, the Court attempted to take a more realistic view of what an
employer’s decision-making process entails. The Court, however,
limited Price Waterhouse’s so-called “mixed motive” framework to
cases where an employee had direct evidence of discrimination. 77 After
Price Waterhouse, there were two paths for plaintiffs claiming
individual disparate treatment to take. First, those plaintiffs with direct
evidence of discrimination could allege that the adverse employment
decision taken against them was the result of mixed motives. Such
plaintiffs could then proceed under the Price Waterhouse framework
and attempt to show that the illegitimate factor was a substantial factor
in the employer’s decision-making process. 78 Alternatively, plaintiffs
with only circumstantial evidence can proceed under the traditional
McDonnell Douglas framework.
Price Waterhouse was soon modified by Congress through the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. The Act amended Title VII to include Section
703(m), which now reads: “Except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the
75. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
76. Id. at 241.
77. This requirement actually comes from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the case. See id. at
261 (O’Connor, J., concurring). This opinion was needed to form a majority and formed the basis of
how many federal courts applied the new “mixed motive” framework after Price Waterhouse.
78. This language also comes from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence. Id. at 265 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). Such a showing by a plaintiff was then subject to an affirmative defense by an employer: If
the employer could show that it would have made the same decision regardless of the illegitimate factor,
the employer would be relieved of all liability. Id. at 276–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 79
This language has been the subject of much debate. In 2003, the
Supreme Court took another look at the “mixed motives” framework in
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. 80 In Desert Palace, Costa, the only
woman employed by defendant as a warehouse worker and heavy
equipment operator in its hotel and casino, filed a claim for sex
discrimination. 81 Costa had numerous problems with management
during the course of her employment and her record contained “an
escalating series of disciplinary sanctions.” 82 Desert Palace fired Costa
after she was involved in a physical altercation with another worker. 83
That worker, Herbert Gerber, who had no disciplinary sanctions on his
record, received only a five day suspension. 84 Costa’s suit for sex
discrimination went to trial and the district court instructed the jurors, in
part, “If you find that the plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in the
defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your
verdict, even if you find that the defendant’s conduct was motivated by a
lawful reason.” 85 Desert Palace objected because respondent had failed
to introduce direct evidence that sex was a motivating factor in her
termination. 86 The circuit court sided with Costa after rehearing the
case en banc. 87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 abrogated the direct evidence requirement
that most circuits had read into Price Waterhouse. The Court held that
direct evidence was not required in order to receive a mixed motive jury
instruction under the Act since there is no such requirement within the
statutory text. 88
At first glance, the case seemed to be a tremendous victory for
employment discrimination plaintiffs. As many scholars noted, the
abrogation of the direct evidence standard would transform every
individual disparate treatment case into a mixed motive case, and they
believed that McDonnell Douglas was dead. 89 If after Desert Palace the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (West 2010).
539 U.S. 90 (2003).
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 95–96.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 97–98.
See, e.g., Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort, supra note 70, at 76 (“By a stroke of the judicial pen,
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motivating factor standard applied in both direct and circumstantial
evidence cases, what room could be left for McDonnell Douglas?
However, this declaration was premature. Footnote 1 in the Desert
Palace decision stated, “This case does not require us to decide when, if
ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context.” 90 This
footnote created some confusion among scholars and provided those
courts, which were reluctant to apply the motivating factor analysis to all
individual disparate treatment claims, with an excuse to avoid its
application. 91 Additionally, the fact that Desert Palace dealt with jury
instructions allowed courts to reason that Desert Palace does not apply
to summary judgment proceedings. 92 Thus, the limited nature of the
Desert Palace decision has caused debate among both scholars and
courts as to what influence, if any, the decision actually had on the
McDonnell Douglas framework.
For one concerned with the possibility of unconscious discrimination,
the Eighth Circuit’s jurisprudence is troubling. If Desert Palace applies
to all individual disparate treatment claims at summary judgment,
plaintiffs would have to show that the employer’s decision was
motivated by, but not solely attributable, to discrimination. This appears
to be a much easier standard and allow more cases to move past the
summary judgment phase. Such a development has enormous potential
to remove society’s biases through the law. 93 Part V explores the
the unanimous Supreme Court in Costa has transformed every Title VII disparate treatment claim into a
‘mixed motives’ claim.”); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 83–84 (2004) (noting that Desert Palace
“essentially eliminates any relevant distinctions between various types of disparate treatment cases”);
Michael Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell
Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1888 (2004) (arguing that the Desert Palace decision will result in
almost all individual disparate treatment cases being governed by Title VII Section 703(m)); Nagy,
supra note 70, at 144–45.
90. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94 n.1. Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended
Title VII to add: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)).
91. See Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment
Law: McDonnell Douglas’s Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 511, 512 (2008)
(“McDonnell Douglas is as viable today as it has ever been and the limited nature of the Desert Palace
opinion, among other things, has contributed to its continuing vitality.”).
92. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
because Desert Palace v. Costa concerned the propriety of the motivating factor standard in jury
instructions, the case had no effect on the court’s summary judgment jurisprudence).
93. Jolls and Sunstein have suggested different ways in which antidiscrimination law can have a
debiasing effect on employers. For example, Jolls and Sunstein have differentiated debiasing law from
debiasing through law. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
199 (2006). The authors use the phrase debiasing law to refer to “strateg[ies] for insulation”—
attempting to protect legal outcomes from falling victim to bounded rationality. Id. at 200. They use the

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
PEDERSEN FINAL FORMAT 2

118

2/11/2011 3:45:55 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

differences between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. These two circuits
use Desert Palace at summary judgment in completely different ways.
It examines cases with similar fact patterns that have come out
differently in each circuit because of the standard each circuit employs
at summary judgment. Part VI explains why the Ninth Circuit’s
approach could indirectly lead to a greater decrease in employers’
implicit biases than the Eighth Circuit’s approach. First, however, this
Article examines why the use of Desert Palace’s motivating factor
framework at summary judgment is so crucial to uncovering implicit
bias.
IV. WHY APPLY THE MOTIVATING FACTOR FRAMEWORK AT THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE?
Summary judgment is a critical phase in all litigation. The literature
on summary judgment is extensive and massive debate has ensued
regarding the merits of summary judgment and whether summary
judgment is being used appropriately, particularly after the Supreme
Court’s 1986 trilogy. 94 This Part summarizes some of the current
concerns with the use of summary judgment and in particular, with its

phrase debiasing through law, however, to refer to the situation where legal policy “operate[s] directly
on the boundedly rational behavior and attempt[s] to help people either to reduce or to eliminate it.” Id.
In another paper, Jolls and Sunstein suggest that in order to reduce implicit bias, debiasing through law
requires that the law act to “reduce people’s level of bias rather than to insulate outcomes from its
effects.” Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 977 (2006).
The authors propose that existing antidiscrimination law not only acts to debias law by insulating
potential discrimination victims from the outcomes of employer’s conscious discrimination, but also
debiases through law by increasing population diversity in the workplace. Id. at 980–81. The authors
argue that by increasing diversity in the workplace, the level of implicit bias is reduced as those holding
such biases are introduced to and familiarized with individuals from the group against whom the bias
was held. Id. at 981–82. The authors also suggest that current law prohibiting hostile work
environments are likely also to have the effect of debiasing through law by operating on the “physical
and sensory environment” of the workplace:
Under current antidiscrimination law, hostile environments featuring negative or
demeaning depictions of protected groups (including, but not limited to, depictions in
posters and other visual media) are generally unlawful in workplaces, educational
institutions, and membership organizations. In this way, current law governing sexual
and racial harassment almost certainly produces some effect on the level of implicit bias
in these institutions. Compared to an environment in which such demeaning depictions
were not unlawful, the current framework is likely to have a debiasing effect.
Id. at 982–83.
94. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139
(2007); Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting
Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591 (2004); Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).
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use in discrimination cases. It then discusses why, with those concerns
in mind, the motivating factor is the right framework to use at this
critical stage in employment discrimination litigation.
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for
summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” 95 Scholars have noted the federal courts’
increased use of summary judgment since the Supreme Court’s 1986
decisions in three cases involving summary judgment standards and
procedures:
In 1986, the now famous Supreme Court “trilogy”—[Celotex, Matsushita
and Anderson]—transformed summary judgment from an infrequently
granted procedural device to a powerful tool for the early resolution of
litigation.
Since then, federal courts have employed summary
judgment . . . in cases that before the trilogy would have proceeded to
trial, or at least through discovery. 96

Motions for summary judgment are rarely granted in favor of
plaintiffs, particularly in employment discrimination cases. In fact,
about 73% of summary judgment motions in employment discrimination
cases are granted and almost all of these are in favor of defendants. 97
This is problematic for several reasons. First, the granting of summary
judgment denies litigants their day in court and the feeling that the
judicial system has accorded them a fair result. Additionally, the denial
of summary judgment shapes the settlement process. Thirdly, judges,
rather than jurors, are more likely to be deferential to defendants seeking
summary judgment, particularly in civil rights cases. Finally, the review
of evidence on summary judgment is necessarily different than at trial
and may take on a contextually different meaning for the judge.
When a plaintiff files a suit, he or she expects justice to be done.
Termination of the suit in favor of the defendant before trial eliminates
the opportunity to present all of the evidence, eliminates the right to go
before a jury, and thwarts the plaintiff’s expectation of justice—all of
which leaves the plaintiff with the feeling she has been deprived of her
day in court. As one scholar has noted, “the telling of the full story in a
public setting can make an important difference to a plaintiff, even if she
ultimately loses.” 98 Leaving plaintiffs with the feeling they have
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
96. Miller, supra note 94, at 984.
97. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709 (2007).
98. Id. at 713.
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somehow been treated unfairly or silenced inappropriately is a concern
to the perceived legitimacy of our judicial system.
In addition to effects on the legitimacy of the system, the grant of
summary judgment also affects the litigation settlement process. When
summary judgment motions are filed by the defendants and denied, the
balance of power shifts from plaintiff to defendant. “For plaintiffs,
summary judgment is the place of ‘do or die.’” 99 “The threat of
summary judgment shapes settlement even in advance of a motion being
filed. And when summary judgment is denied, lawyers and judges
report that defendants immediately offer to settle, often with far more
generous settlement offers than they might have otherwise
considered.” 100
Thirdly, in civil rights cases and particularly in the employment
discrimination context, summary judgment rulings are made by a judge,
rather than trial by jury, which often results in a ruling bias in favor of
defendants. Scholars have noted the readiness of courts to defer to
defendants’ stated reasons for an employment action, rather than credit a
plaintiff’s accusations of discrimination. 101 Courts are hesitant to
second-guess employers’ business practices and tend to credit any
seemingly legitimate reason articulated by employers for a given
employment decision. 102 This is problematic in the employment context
where a multitude of reasons may account for an adverse employment
action.
Finally, when employment discrimination cases are decided by judges
at the summary judgment stage, there is a tendency for judges to
examine the evidence presented in a piecemeal fashion rather than in a
holistic way. 103 This is damaging to plaintiffs because evidence of
99. Id. at 715–16. See also Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling
Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 45, 48 (2005).
100. Schneider, supra note 97, at 716.
101. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 889, 891 (2006) (noting that “[s]cholars have also documented well the judiciary’s failure
to redress more subtle discrimination and the judiciary’s readiness to defer to the defendant’s stated
reason for the challenged employment action”); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured
Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203,
231 (1993) (“Courts believe defendants when they articulate their non-discriminatory reasons for the
employment decision and disbelieve plaintiffs when they attempt to prove that defendants’ articulated
reasons are pretextual.”); Michael Selmi, Employment Discrimination and the Problem of Proof: A
Symposium: Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556
(2001) (“[C]ourts are also affected by various biases that help explain their treatment of employment
discrimination cases. . . . When it comes to race cases, which are generally the most difficult for a
plaintiff to succeed on, courts often seem mired in a belief that the claims are generally unmeritorious,
brought by whining plaintiffs who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along the way.”).
102. Parker, supra note 101, at 891, 927.
103. See McGinley, supra note 101, at 233; see also Schneider, supra note 97, at 729 (“In ruling
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discrimination does not lend itself to isolated examination, but rather,
discrimination often becomes apparent only in the context provided by a
holistic examination of a defendant’s past acts and practices.
There are benefits to courts’ increased use of summary judgment.
Disposing of a case by means of summary judgment eases pressures on
the judicial docket and can increase the efficiency of the litigation
process. 104 Additionally, summary judgment can be a legitimate means
of saving the opposing party money in otherwise frivolous litigation.
However, all of this assumes that the underlying litigation is not
meritorious. When summary judgment is used to control judicial
caseloads, at the expense of otherwise legitimate cases, the device can
be problematic. 105 This is precisely the use demonstrated in many
employment discrimination cases. This issue is further complicated by
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 106 In that case,
the Court heightened the pleading standard for discrimination plaintiffs,
noting that:
bare assertions [that] amount to nothing more than a “formulaic recitation
of the elements” of a constitutional discrimination claim, namely, that
petitioners adopted a policy “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group” . . . are conclusory and not
entitled to be assumed true. 107

This case has left many wondering exactly what a discrimination
plaintiff needs to prove in order to show the requisite intent. Therefore,
it is foreseeable that in the wake of Iqbal, courts will be more likely to
use mechanisms, such as the motion to dismiss and the motion for
summary judgment, to dispose of cases.
Therefore, it becomes critical to identify ways that meritorious claims
can be kept on the docket even after a summary judgment motion is
filed. Using the motivating factor framework at the summary judgment
level may alleviate federal courts’ tendencies to simply defer to an
employer once the employer has supplied some type of reason for its
decision. Additionally, this framework may allow judges the freedom to
view various pieces of evidence as parts of a whole because the
existence of various motivations would be allowed. However, as
on summary judgment motions, judges frequently slice and dice law and fact in a technical and
mechanistic way without evaluating the broad context on an arid record, a record that is limited to
discovery.”).
104. Bradley Scott Shannon, Should Summary Judgment Be Granted?, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 114
(2008).
105. Id.
106. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
107. Id. at 1951 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979)).
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discussed more fully in Part VI.B, infra, the use of the motivating factor
framework holds the potential for even more powerful indirect
deterrence of employer discrimination by setting up an incentive system
whereby the employer would be motivated to discover and attempt to
mitigate any effect of implicit bias. Summary judgment is a crucial
phase in employment discrimination litigation and the importance of
employing the correct test—one that recognizes the importance of the
perceived legitimacy of our judicial system, the pivotal role of
settlement power, and the tendency of judges to defer to defendants and
examine evidence in isolation—is integral to ensuring correct results in
these cases. Just as crucial is employing a framework at summary
judgment that has the potential to modify employers’ behavior,
particularly behavior of which they may be unaware. The motivating
factor framework holds this potential. But in reality, does it make a
difference at the summary judgment stage?
V. CURRENT CASE LAW
As noted in Section III supra, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have
taken vastly different approaches to how, if at all, Desert Palace affects
the McDonnell Douglas analysis. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit has held that Desert Palace did not affect the
McDonnell Douglas analysis at the summary judgment phase. In
Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 108 the court wrote:
Desert Palace involved the post-trial issue of when the trial court
should give a “mixed motive” jury instruction under 1991 Title VII
amendments codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
The Court’s opinion did not even cite McDonnell Douglas, much less
discuss how those statutes impact our prior summary judgment decisions.
While in general the standard for granting summary judgment “mirrors”
the standard for judgment as a matter of law, the context of the two
inquiries are significantly different. At the summary judgment stage, the
issue is whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence that unlawful
discrimination was a motivating factor in the defendant’s adverse
employment action. If so, the presence of additional legitimate motives
will not entitle the defendant to summary judgment. Therefore, evidence
of additional motives, and the question whether the presence of mixed
motives defeats all or some part of plaintiff’s claim, are trial issues, not
summary judgment issues. Thus, Desert Palace, a decision in which the
Supreme Court decided only a mixed motive jury instruction issue, is an
inherently unreliable basis for district courts to begin ignoring this

108. 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004).
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Circuit’s controlling summary judgment precedents. 109

While this explication of Desert Palace’s relation to McDonnell
Douglas at the summary judgment phase does not seem to require a
plaintiff to continue to show sole factor motivation at summary
judgment, the Eighth Circuit’s further elaboration of its reasoning in
Gilbert v. Des Moines Area Community College, 110 does not provide as
much hope for plaintiffs. The Gilbert court stated:
As an initial matter, Gilbert attacks the district court’s method of
analysis, arguing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, modified the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis by clarifying Title VII only requires a
showing that discrimination was a motivating factor in an employment
decision. Gilbert contends the district court employed a more restrictive
standard at the summary judgment stage by analyzing Gilbert’s claim
pursuant to McDonnell Douglas and erroneously required Gilbert to
demonstrate race was the sole motivating factor in the challenged
employment decision. We disagree. We previously have rejected the
argument that Desert Palace modified our court’s use of the three-part
McDonnell Douglas analysis at the summary judgment stage of an
employment discrimination lawsuit. 111

While the court further noted that there was no evidence that the
district court “improperly hinged Gilbert’s race discrimination claim on
Gilbert’s ability to show race was the sole factor in [the] decision not to
promote [him],” 112 the holding seems to belie this notion. In forcing
Gilbert to fashion his case under the traditional McDonnell Douglas
pretext model, the court forced Gilbert to demonstrate that
discrimination was the real reason behind his denial of the promotion.
For instance, although Gilbert demonstrated that he was more qualified
than the candidate eventually selected for the job, the Eighth Circuit
refused to rely on this finding for pretext, noting that courts defer to
employers to make internal business decisions. The court stated,
“although an employer’s selection of a less qualified candidate can
support a finding that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for the
hiring was pretextual, it is the employer’s role to identify those strengths
that constitute the best qualified applicant.” 113 Had the court actually
been using the motivating factor analysis, it would have been difficult to
affirm summary judgment with such a fact on the record. Thus, it seems
that the Eighth Circuit really employs the McDonnell Douglas sole
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 735 (internal citations omitted).
495 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 914 n.6 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 916 (quoting Kincaid v. City of Omaha, 318 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 2004)).
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factor analysis at the summary judgment stage, making it much more
difficult for plaintiffs to defeat such a motion.
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has held that:
when responding to a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff is
presented with a choice regarding how to establish his or her case.
[Plaintiff] may proceed by using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or
alternatively, may simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence
demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated
[defendant]. 114

The court subsequently clarified this standard, noting that a plaintiff
“may prove either that he was not promoted ‘because of’ his race
(‘single-motive’) or that race was a ‘motivating factor’ in the County’s
decision (‘mixed-motive’) . . . [Plainitff] need not identify in advance
which type of case he is attempting to prove.” 115 This standard, as
opposed to that of the Eighth Circuit, seems to be much more favorable
towards plaintiffs at the summary judgment phase. The remainder of
Part V tests this hypothesis by examining four sets of matched
employment discrimination cases, all decided after the Desert Palace
decision. This Part examines whether these cases, with similar factual
scenarios, result in a different legal outcome depending on which
standard they are decided under. To locate these cases, a search of all
cases in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits containing the terms “McDonnell
Douglas” and “Desert Palace” was performed. It is interesting to note
that there were many more cases in the Ninth Circuit reversing summary
judgment in favor of the employer than in the Eighth Circuit. 116 For
each matched case below, the facts and the appeals court’s reasoning is
discussed followed by a comparison of the two cases. The matched case
approach is used as a way of comparing factually similar cases in order
to compare whether different legal frameworks affect the outcome.
Admittedly the cases do not have identical facts and the analysis will not
be perfect in controlling for these differences. To the extent possible,
however, the cases are very similar in their facts and should provide a
strong mechanism of comparison.

114. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
1180 (2008).
115. Gibson v. King County, 256 F. App’x 39, 41 (9th Cir. 2007).
116. In the six years since Desert Palace was decided, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the
employer (either upholding a grant of summary judgment or reversing a denial of such a judgment) in a
mixed-motives case about as many times as it overruled such a judgment. In contrast, in those same
years, the Eighth Circuit ruled for the employer (either upholding summary judgment or reversing a
denial of summary judgment) about six times as often as it held in favor of the employee.
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The matched cases examined are visually presented in the table that
follows:
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Sallis v. University of Minnesota, Dominguez-Curry
v.
Nevada
408 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 2005).
Transportation Department, 424
F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005).
Maxfield v. Cintad Corp., No. 2, Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d
427 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2005).
919 (9th Cir. 2007).
Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit
F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006).
Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir.
2006).
Montes v. Greater Twin Cities Gibson v. King County, 256 Fed.
Youth Symphonies (GTCYS), 2008 Appx. 39 (9th Cir. 2007)
WL 3927231 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, (unpublished).
2008).
Sallis v. University of Minnesota
Facts of Sallis
Appellant, James Sallis, an African-American male, worked as a
delivery person at the University of Minnesota. 117 He was transferred to
the Fourth Street Parking Ramp as a result of reassignment caused by
layoffs. 118 After his transfer, he sought, but was not hired for three other
positions at the University of Minnesota. 119 The first position he applied
for, third-shift general maintenance supervisor, was chosen by a panel of
three interviewers. 120 They each rated Sallis lower in several categories
than the applicant who received the job, although Sallis did have more
supervisory experience than the candidate who received the job. 121 The
second position was a mechanic position which required technical
knowledge and skills. 122 Sallis possessed less training time and field
experience than the other applicant. 123 The third position was that of
athletic equipment worker with the University of Minnesota football

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 472 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 472–73.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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team. 124 He was also denied this position and contended that the denial
was based on his race. 125 During the time he had worked at the Fourth
Street Parking Ramp, his supervisor called him “tan” in front of others,
and he had also heard a parking attendant use the racial epithet “niggers”
and complain “about ‘all of the damn Somalians.’” 126 Sallis brought
suit for racial discrimination in the United States Court for the District of
Minnesota. 127 The district court granted the university’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that even if Sallis made a prima facie case
of discrimination for failure to promote, Sallis was not able to show that
the university proffered reasons for its decisions were pretextual. 128
Eighth Circuit’s Reasoning
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment. 129 Sallis argued that the district court had
misapplied Desert Palace. 130 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, noting that
Desert Palace only applies to mixed motive cases, and since “Sallis
produced no convincing evidence, circumstantial or direct, that race
motivated UM’s decisions not to promote him, [w]e therefore proceed
under McDonnell Douglas.” 131 The court concluded, in accordance with
the district court, that Sallis’s claim failed under McDonnell Douglas
because he could not show that the university’s proffered reasons for not
hiring him were illegitimate. 132 The court noted that “Sallis failed to
offer evidence in response [to UM’s proffered reasons] showing that
UM’s qualification claim was pretextual and that the actual motivating
factor was race discrimination.” 133
Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transportation Dept.
Facts of Dominguez-Curry
Sylvia Dominguez-Curry worked under the supervision of Rob Stacey
in the Nevada Department of Transportation’s contract compliance
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 475–476.
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division. 134
According to Dominguez-Curry, Stacey often made
demeaning comments to and about women. 135 For instance, Stacey had
told Dominguez-Curry and other women in her department that “he
wished he could get men to do [their] jobs” and “women should only be
in subservient positions.” 136 He also expressed concern about women
with children working at the company. 137 Stacey was eventually
promoted to Contract Compliance Manager, and around the same time,
the department announced an opening in the division for the Program
Officer III position. 138 Stacey and another employee, Elicegui, made the
hiring decision and both independently chose a male candidate, Phillip
Andrews, rather than Dominguez-Curry. 139 Dominguez-Curry admitted
Andrews “was very qualified, and he may be more qualified than me,
but that was not the—I just knew because he had the right body parts is
why he got hired, in addition to being qualified.” 140 Stacey contended
that gender did not influence his decision and that the new hire’s
qualifications were simply superior. 141 Dominguez-Curry brought suit
against the Nevada Transportation Department and Stacey, alleging,
inter alia, failure to promote based on sex discrimination. 142 The district
court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that
Dominguez-Curry did not present evidence that the defendant’s
proffered legitimate reason was a pretext for sex discrimination. 143
Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning
Dominguez-Curry appealed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding “that appellees’
decision not to hire Dominguez was motivated at least in part by her
gender.” 144 The court reasoned that:
Even if it were uncontested that Andrew’s qualifications were
superior, this would not preclude a finding of discrimination. An
employer may be held liable under Title VII even if it had a legitimate
reason for its employment decision, as long as an illegitimate reason was
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Domingues-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1033.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1033–34.
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a motivating factor in the decision . . . Here, the evidence ultimately may
permit a finding that appellees had a legitimate reason for hiring Andrews
over Dominguez. However, because a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the hiring decision was motivated at least in part by her
gender, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
the [defendant]. 145

The court cited Desert Palace in its reasoning and noted that: “the
plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a violation through a
preponderance of the evidence . . . that a protected characteristic played
‘a motivating factor.’ To overcome summary judgment, a plaintiff
merely must raise a triable issue as to this question. Dominguez has met
this burden.” 146
Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning
It is striking to note not only the difference in outcomes in Sallis and
Dominguez-Curry, but also the difference in reasoning that led to those
results. The Eighth Circuit was adamant in its refusal to even consider
that Sallis’s supervisor’s remarks may have indicated a bias that
influenced the decision-making process. Rather, the court steadfastly
asserted that the case was not a mixed motive case and that there was no
evidence that race played a motivating factor in the decision-making
process even though the candidate hired for one of the positions may
actually have been less qualified than Sallis.
In stark contrast to this logic, the Ninth Circuit in Dominguez-Curry
held that it was possible that sex may have played a factor on the
company’s failure to promote the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff
herself admitted that she was less qualified than the person actually
hired. The Ninth Circuit used the reasoning of Desert Palace to
conclude that the possibility of gender discrimination was not foreclosed
simply because the defendant may also have had legitimate reasons for
making the decision that it did.
The differences in the two circuits’ interpretation of Desert Palace in
these cases led to a difference in whether plaintiff got before a jury on
his or her claims of discrimination. As discussed in Part III supra, such
a difference can be crucial in an employment discrimination case,
leading not only to a possible victory for plaintiff in court, but also
greatly increasing the potential for settlement. A further exploration of
other cases in which the Eighth and Ninth Circuits employed Desert
Palace differently will help to illustrate more clearly the potential
145. Id. at 1040–41 (internal citations omitted).
146. Id. at 1042 (internal citation omitted).
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impact the differing standards have on Title VII litigation.
Maxfield v. Cintas Corp., No. 2
Facts of Maxfield
Darold Maxfield, an African-American male, worked for Cintas
Corporation as a facility outside sales representative from May 2000
until his discharge in August 2002. 147 Maxfield was also in the United
States Army and was granted, several military leaves during his time at
Cintas. 148 Maxfield did well at Cintas for a while. 149 Then, in May
2001, for the first time, his draw exceeded his commission. 150 This
continued until July 2001. 151 At that time, he took another military
leave of absence. 152 While on leave, he was transferred to a different
position. 153 In January 2002, he was placed in another position, which
he believed to be a demotion. 154 In August 2002, Randy Lewis, the
general manager of the facility, suspended Maxfield because Maxfiled
tried to take sick/emergency leave while on military leave. 155 Lewis
told Maxfield that this was against company policy and that “he had
stolen from the company.” 156 Cintas terminated Maxfield four days
later. 157 Cintas actually allowed employees to take sick leave while on
military leave. 158 Maxfield brought suit against Cintas for race
discrimination pursuant to Title VII as well as violations of the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act in
relation to his military leave. 159 The district court granted summary
judgment for Cintas on both counts and Maxfield appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 160

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 427 F.3d 544, 547–49 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 547–48.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 547–48.
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

33

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
PEDERSEN FINAL FORMAT 2

130

2/11/2011 3:45:55 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Eighth Circuit’s Reasoning
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Maxfield’s race discrimination claim. 161 The court
assumed that Maxfield had asserted a prima facie case of racial
discrimination based on his demotion and subsequent discharge. 162 The
court, however, held that Cintas had articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for these actions and that Maxfield had not
shown those reasons to be a pretext for discrimination. 163 As to the
demotion, the court held that although Maxfield offered evidence that a
white employee, who ran a deficit for two months, had not been
transferred, this was insufficient because Maxfield had run a deficit for
four months. 164 The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of Cintas on Maxfield’s claim of discriminatory termination even
though Maxfield was able to show that Cintas’s proffered reason for
firing him—that he took sick leave concurrently with military leave in
violation of company policy—was not actually true. 165 The court relied
on St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 166 discussed supra note 42, to hold
that even though Maxfield had discredited Cintas’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason, this was not sufficient to surmount a motion for
summary judgment because there was no showing that discrimination
was the actual reason for the termination. 167
Metoyer v. Chassman
Facts of Metoyer
In March 1998, Patricia Metoyer, an African-American female, was
hired as Executive Administrator by the Screen Actors Guild (SAG). 168
At that time, she was promised that she would shortly be elevated to the
soon-to-be-created position of Affirmative Action Director. 169 Over one
year later, when the promotion still had not occurred, Metoyer petitioned
the SAG’s Senior Staff to create the position; this request was denied by
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
(2008).
169.

Id. at 549–50 (The court reversed and remanded on the USERRA claim.).
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id.
Id.
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Maxfield, 427 F.3d at 550–51.
Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 923–24 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. dismissed, 553 U.S. 1049,
Id. at 924.
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John McGuire, the SAG’s Acting Executive National Director. 170 Linda
Schick, the National Director of Human Resources, explained to
Metoyer that “[t]here are no people of color on senior staff, and it’s very
unlikely that there will be.” 171
During the course of her employment with the SAG, Metoyer said she
was approached by minority employees who had complaints of racial
discrimination. 172 She alleged that the supervisors receiving her
complaints responded with racist comments. 173 She was also told she
was “too outspoken.” 174 During the course of her time at the SAG,
Metoyer became concerned about irregularities with grant money at the
organization. 175 In particular, she questioned the allocation of funds on
several grants which were mandated to have affirmative action
components and projects in them. 176 Metoyer, however, was also the
subject of an investigation into the inappropriate use of grant funds, and
Metoyer eventually admitted to some of the suspected misuse. 177 After
this admission, she was suspended with pay and eventually fired for
inappropriate use of the funds. 178
Metoyer brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination
and retaliation. As the Ninth Circuit noted in its opinion, § 1981 claims
are analyzed using “the same legal principles as those applicable to a
Title VII disparate treatment case.” 179 Thus, the court allows the
plaintiff to surmount a summary judgment challenge using the
McDonnell Douglas framework or by producing “direct or
circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more
likely than not motivated [the employer].” 180 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the employer and Metoyer appealed. 181
Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 925–26.
Id.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 930.
Id. (quoting Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 931 (quoting Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 923.
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judgment on Metoyer’s wrongful termination and retaliation claims. 182
Regarding the wrongful termination claim, the court held that although
the SAG claimed that Metoyer was terminated because of the audit,
which showed she had misappropriated more than $30,000 in grant
funds, there was also evidence of racial animus by employees at the
SAG that could have influenced the decision-making process. 183 As the
court wrote, “[t]he plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a
violation through a preponderance of the evidence . . . that a protected
characteristic played a motivating factor. To overcome summary
judgment, a plaintiff merely must raise a triable issue as to this
question.” 184 Thus, the court held that it was inappropriate for the
district court to grant summary judgment to the defendant because the
plaintiff had adduced evidence that race may have been a motivating
factor in her firing, in addition to defendant’s proffered legitimate reason
for terminating her employment. 185
Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning
These cases demonstrate an interesting contrast in the outcomes to
which differing standards at summary judgment can lead. In Maxfield,
although the defendant’s proffered legitimate reason was shown to be
untrue and although an arguably similarly-situated white employee was
not fired for the same lackluster performance, the Eighth Circuit
steadfastly asserted that the plaintiff had been unable to adduce enough
evidence at summary judgment to show that racial discrimination was
the real reason for the termination. In stark contrast in Metoyer, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment to the employer,
despite the employer’s truthful proffered reason that the termination was
due to plaintiff’s misappropriation of $30,000 of grant funds because the
court could not rule out the possibility that racial animus also factored
into the decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment.
The importance of the legal standard in a discrimination case becomes
apparent from these two cases. The use of Desert Palace’s motivating
factor analysis at summary judgment allows cases, like Metoyer, to
proceed to trial even where the plaintiff admittedly engaged in
wrongdoing on the job because the Desert Palace standard is not based
on the notion that there can be only one reason for an employment
decision. Strict adherence to the McDonnell Douglas analysis results in
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 942.
Id. at 939.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id.
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the curtailment of potentially legitimate discrimination claims at
summary judgment simply because a plaintiff cannot show that
defendant’s real reason—and the only reason allowed in the eyes of
courts adhering to this standard—was discrimination.
Arraleh v. County of Ramsey
Facts of Arraleh
The County of Ramsey (the County) hired Rashid Arraleh, an
African-American Muslim, as a temporary Employment Guidance
Counselor in its Workforce Solutions Program in 2002. 186 During his
employment, Arraleh often double-booked or missed client
appointments. 187 He claimed that such practices were not unusual in the
Workforce Solutions Program. 188 Two coworkers supported Arraleh’s
assertion. 189 Arraleh claimed that his supervisor, Terry Zurn, treated
him differently than white employees by keeping a complaint log for
Arraleh, which was not kept for white employees. 190 Arraleh claimed
that he overheard coworkers use the terms “those people” and “those
damn Muslims” around him and told him that people of African dissent
are “emotional.” 191 He also overheard a conversation between a County
employee and Zurn during which the employee told Zurn that hiring
Arraleh is like “raising terrorist kids.” 192 Arraleh was considered for
two permanent positions at the County, but was not hired for either. 193
Patricia Brady, the director of Workforce Solutions, who had previously
approved Arraleh’s temporary employment, made the final decision not
to hire him permanently, along with Zurn. 194 Arraleh also claimed that
Brady had once told African-American employees that they needed to
“leave their blackness behind.” 195 Arraleh sued the County for
discrimination based on race and national origin due to, inter alia, their
failure to hire him in the permanent positions for which he was
considered. 196 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 972.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 972–73.
Id. at 973.
Id. at 973–74.
Id. at 971, 974.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 970–71.
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the County on all counts and Arraleh appealed. 197
Eighth Circuit’s Reasoning
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Arraleh’s failure to hire claim, holding that, even if Arraleh
presented a prima facie case of disparate treatment, he failed to show
that the County’s proffered legitimate reason—that the education and
work experience of the candidate selected best fit the requirements for
the position—was pretextual. 198 The court specifically noted that the
fact that Zurn had previously decided to hire Arraleh, six months before,
“suggests that racial and national origin discrimination were not the
motivating factors behind the adverse employment action.” 199
Additionally, the court reasoned that since the employees subsequently
hired for the jobs Arraleh applied for were all minorities, with the one
exception, it was not the court’s job to sit as a super-personnel
department and grant summary judgment. 200
Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union
Facts of Cornwell
Electra Central Credit Union (Electra) hired Raymond Cornwell, an
African-American male, as its Director of Lending in August 1993 and
subsequently promoted him to Chief Operating Officer. 201 Under his
supervision, Electra’s loan portfolio grew dramatically until 2001,
suffering somewhat of a decrease after that. 202 Cornwell was the only
African-American member of the management team. 203 In September
2001, Jim Sharp became the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
Electra. 204 After Sharp became CEO, he often excluded Cornwell from
management team meetings, and allegedly made inappropriate
comments about women. 205 Cornwell also alleged that Sharp made
racial comments about an African-American employee at the

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 971.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 977 (emphasis added).
Id. at 976–78.
Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d. 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1022, 1032.
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company. 206 In December 2001, Sharp informed the management team
that he intended to reorganize operations, which resulted in demoting
Cornwell to Vice President of Lending. 207 A Caucasian woman was
hired to take over some of his duties. 208 Cornwell was the only member
of the management team demoted. 209 After complaining about what he
perceived to be a racially motivated demotion, Cornwell offered not to
sue Electra for race discrimination if Electra offered him a severance
package. Electra terminated Cornwell’s employment and replaced him
with an African-American female. 210 Cornwell sued Electra for race
discrimination pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 211 The
district court granted summary judgment for Electra and Cornwell
appealed. 212
Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit purportedly analyzed this case under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, but noted that, after Desert Palace:
it is not particularly significant whether [plaintiff] relies on the
McDonnell Douglas presumption, or whether [plaintiff] relies on direct or
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent to meet his burden.
Under either approach, [plaintiff] must produce some evidence suggesting
that [the employment decision] was due in part or whole to
discriminatory intent . . . . 213

With regard to Cornwell’s demotion, the court held that he produced
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether defendants demoted him because of his race. 214 Specifically,
the court reasoned:
[t]he truth might be that all of Sharp’s management aims were legitimate
and matters of prerogative and personal style. But a jury could also find
on the summary judgment record that a discriminatory intention was at
work, and in our view [plaintiff] presented sufficient evidence to place
this issue in the jury’s province for decision. 215

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1023.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1022–25.
Id. at 1022.
Id.
Id. at 1030 (emphasis added, internal citation omitted).
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1034.
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Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning
The divergence in outcomes in the cases is striking. In Arraleh, as in
Cornwell, the court was presented with an employee who was not doing
exceedingly well in his job. In each case, the employee alleged that
discriminatory remarks had been made in the workplace and that
underlying racial animus had contributed to the adverse employment
decision. In fact, in Arraleh, the actual decision-makers partook in these
racist conversations. However, the Eighth Circuit seemed to attribute
great weight to the fact that the same people who hired Arraleh were the
ones who fired him and thus, could not have been discriminatory in their
hiring.
Although the situation differed in the Ninth Circuit case, it clear that
the Ninth Circuit’s motivating factor analysis would likely not afford the
so-called “same decision-maker defense” dispositive weight. If one
argues that the Ninth Circuit analysis is more realistic in terms of how
decisions are actually made, then it is entirely possible that a decisionmaker could hire a person of a certain race for a variety of reasons,
including, perhaps, an affirmative action mandate on hiring, and then
fire that person as soon as a seemingly legitimate reason presents itself.
In that case, race would have played a motivating factor in both the
hiring and discharge decisions. 216 The Eighth Circuit does not allow for
this possibility, assuming instead that the decision-maker, who hires a
minority worker, does not take race into account at the hiring stage and
therefore, could not do so at the termination stage either. Such thinking
does not comport with the realities of the employment setting. As
Krieger and Fiske have noted:
There are well-founded reasons for believing that implicit bias will
express itself less readily in the hiring context than later in the
employment relationship. In particular, the hiring context tends to make
equal employment opportunity (EEO) norms and goals salient. As such,
managers may be more vigilant about inhibiting responses based on
stereotypes or other implicit attitudes. Moreover, during the hiring
process, human-resources specialists or EEO managers may play a role in
selecting applicants for a “short list,” may be present at interviews, or
may review decisions for compliance with the employer’s EEO policies
and goals. Where this occurs, the person who actually makes the hiring
decision may be influenced in ways that blunt the effects of any implicit
stereotypes he holds. However, this influence may wane as time goes on
216. Affirmative action programs of private employers are legally acceptable if they are
temporary, used in a job category in which there is a manifest demographic imbalance, and do not
unnecessarily trample the rights of innocent third parties. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616
(1987).
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and equal opportunity goals become less prominent.
....
There is, in short, little reason to believe that an implicitly biased
employment decision maker who has hired a stereotyped person will
necessarily succeed in keeping his or her subsequent evaluations of that
person’s performance free from the influence of implicit stereotypes. 217

The notion that attitudes may change or at least manifest themselves
differently according to the situation is in contrast to the notion that a
person’s attitudes (i.e., his or her disposition) is constant over time and
context. As Krieger and Fiske note, “[P]eople, including judges, have a
tendency to overestimate the role of stable traits or tastes and to
underestimate the role of situational variables in shaping social
perception and behavior.” 218 Psychological research has shown that the
former view of personality is often more consistent with the actualities
of the work setting. 219 Thus, incorporating the Ninth Circuit’s
motivating factor analysis into the disparate treatment framework allows
judges to at least entertain the possibility that the same decision-maker
has both hired and fired a minority worker or woman. Therefore, it is
not a foregone conclusion that racial or gender biases could not have
played a factor in the decision to terminate the employee. There is
simply no room for such behavioral realities in the Eighth Circuit’s
single factor McDonnell Douglas analysis.
Montes v. Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies
Facts of Montes
Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies (GTCYS) hired Dr. Jean
Montes as its Artistic Director in July 2003. 220 Dr. Montes was born in
Haiti and immigrated to the United States when he was approximately
eighteen years old. 221 During the course of his employment with
GTCYS, board members often characterized Montes as AfricanAmerican and the president of the board, Charlie Feuss, allegedly
referred to Montes on several occasions as la bête noire of the
organization. 222 The phrase’s literal translation is “the black beast,”
though it has been incorporated into the English language to mean “one

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Krieger & Fiske, supra note 17, at 1051–52.
Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1050.
Montes v. Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies, 540 F.3d 852, 853 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 854.
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that is particularly disliked or that is to be avoided.” 223 Montes alleged
that he often felt as if he was not welcomed or supported at GTYCS,
citing as examples the fact that the board once asked him to restructure
the orchestra to reduce costs and approved his recommendation to
reassign two conductors. 224 However, when others later opposed the
decision, the board did not support Montes. 225 Additionally, a board
member suggested that the board form an African-American Committee
to assist Montes’s transition to the community. 226
David Ranheim, the interim Executive Director at GTCYS, often
demeaned and belittled Montes, calling him “an African conductor.”227
Montes stated that he discussed Ranheim’s conduct with Feuss, but
nothing was done. 228 The Board reprimanded Montes for recruiting
GYCYS members to attend the Allegro Music Camp, with whom
Montes was also employed. 229 Montes stated that it was a tradition for
GTCYS personnel to participate in the camp, and he had discussed the
recruitment with the former president of GTCYS. 230 The board
ultimately terminated Montes when he refused to sign a Counseling
Report unless the whole board agreed he should sign it. The report
basically acknowledged that he had taken the position with Allegro
without board authority and that he agreed to consult with the board
before taking any future outside jobs. 231 One board member actually
resigned over Montes’s termination, writing in his resignation letter that
“certain perceptions about Dr. Montes have been based on incomplete
information, inaccurate details, biases, and misunderstandings.” 232
Montes sued GTYCS for racial and national origin discrimination
pursuant to Title VII based on his termination; the district court granted
summary judgment for GYTCS and Montes appealed. 233
Eighth Circuit’s Reasoning
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855–56.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 856–57.
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judgment for GTYCS. 234 The circuit court held that Montes was unable
to show, pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, that GYTCS’s
proffered reason for terminating Montes was pretextual because he was
unwilling to cooperate with board and staff members. 235 The district
court stated that the suggestion about the African-American committee
was not evidence of discrimination because it was made in the context of
Montes’s hiring, not his termination, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 236
The circuit court concluded by noting: “While use of the phrase la bête
noire gives us pause, we conclude that the evidence taken as a whole is
insufficient to permit a reasonable jury, without resort to speculation, to
draw [an] inference that the board terminated Montes’s employment
because of his race or national origin.” 237
Gibson v. King County
Facts of Gibson
John Gibson, an African-American employee of the King County fire
department, brought suit against the county for discriminatory failure to
promote on account of race pursuant to Title VII. 238 Gibson alleged that
the Interim Assistant Fire Marshal and the Fire Marshal made
discriminatory remarks to him during the course of his employment and
both of these individuals had some influence in the promotion
decision. 239 When he applied for a promotion to the position of
Assistant Fire Marshal, the Fire Marshal told him he was more
comfortable with the white candidate being promoted, and the Interim
Assistant Fire Marshal told Gibson he was different, which prevented
his promotion. 240 Of note, the investigation unit had not employed any
African-American employees, other than Gibson, in over twenty years,
and the interview panels assembled by the Fire Marshal contained no
racial minorities. 241 The district court granted judgment as a matter of

234. Id. at 860.
235. Id. at 858.
236. Id. at 857.
237. Id. at 859 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
238. Gibson v. King County, 256 F. App’x 39, 40 (9th Cir. 2007). Although the opinion is
unpublished, it is still pertinent to this Article because it demonstrates the difference in outcomes that
may result from differing standards at summary judgment and beyond. The opinion is not being
analyzed in light of any precedential value, and therefore, its publication status is of no consequence for
the current purposes.
239. Id. at 41.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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law 242 for the County and Gibson appealed. 243
Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the employer on the failure-to-promote claim. 244
The court set out the legal framework for analyzing whether judgment as
a matter of law was appropriate: Gibson may prove either that he was
not promoted:
“because of” his race (“single-motive”) or that his race was a “motivating
factor” in the County’s decision (“mixed-motive”). . . . Gibson need not
identify in advance which type of case he is attempting to prove; rather,
the district court will determine the appropriate standard on which to
instruct the jury upon deciding “what legal conclusions the evidence
could reasonably support.” 245

The court reasoned that viewing the discriminatory remarks made to
Gibson by both the Interim Assistant Fire Marshal and the Fire Marshal
in conjunction with their influence over the promotion decision and the
absence of black employees in the fire department, a reasonable jury
could conclude that race was a motivating factor in the employment
decision. 246 Additionally, the court noted that the decision-making
process was highly subjective and that “subjective practices are
particularly susceptible to discriminatory abuse and should be closely
scrutinized.” 247
Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s Reasoning
The Eighth Circuit once again demonstrated the rigidity of the single
motive analysis, noting its discomfort with the term la bête noire, but
refusing to allow this consideration to dominate the analysis. In
contrast, if the Eighth Circuit were using a motivating factor analysis
akin to what the Ninth Circuit employs, it could have stated that the
242. The standard for judgment as a matter of law is similar to that for summary judgment, except
that it requires a finding, by the judge that, after a party has been heard on an issue, a “reasonable jury
would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” FED. R. CIV. P.
50(a).
243. Gibson, 256 F. App’x at 40.
244. Id. at 42.
245. Id. at 41 (quoting Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)).
246. Id. at 42.
247. Id. at 41 (quoting Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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reason given by GYTCS was legitimate, but that the surrounding
circumstances, including the la bête noire comment indicated that race
was potentially a motivating factor. This would have allowed a jury to
evaluate the claim in its entirety instead of the case being completely
dismissed on summary judgment.
Additionally, it is interesting that the Ninth Circuit in Gibson
embraced an even more liberal interpretation of the motivating factor
analysis by allowing a plaintiff to refrain from asserting under which
framework to pursue and to present all evidence, which allows the court
to decide the more appropriate framework. Such a standard results in
more cases surviving summary judgment and results in more cases going
to a jury if a protected characteristic can possibly be considered to have
been at least a motivating factor in the decision.
The difference in legal standards articulated by the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits in disparate treatment cases leads to different outcomes. In
particular, the Eighth Circuit’s standard results in most cases being
dismissed at the summary judgment phase while the Ninth Circuit’s
motivating factor analysis allows more cases to proceed to trial. Part VI
discusses the importance of this implication.
VI. POTENTIAL FOR DETECTION OF IMPLICIT BIAS
As discussed in Part V, the differing approaches that the Eighth and
the Ninth Circuits take in individual disparate treatment cases at the
summary judgment stage have implications for the plaintiff’s likelihood
of success in the case. Employing the motivating factor standard at
summary judgment allows greater opportunity for a case to at least
survive the summary judgment phase of litigation and proceed to trial.
This seemingly obvious premise is bolstered by the analysis in Part V,
demonstrating the difference in outcomes that arise when a motivating
factor as opposed to a single factor analysis is used at the summary
judgment stage. As discussed in Part V, however, this difference in
outcomes could have a potentially huge impact on the success of
plaintiffs in making it past summary judgment, and on the law’s ability
to help uncover implicit bias. The analysis in this Part proceeds in two
stages. First, this Part analyzes the literature on the automatic nature of
stereotypes and the ways in which such stereotypes can be mitigated.
Then, it ties these findings to the notion that if judges, under the
motivating factor analysis, are more likely to deny summary judgment to
defendants in employment discrimination cases, employers may be
forced, at the time the employment decision is made, to give serious
thought to all the reasons underlying the decision. If this is true, implicit
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bias may be brought to the forefront and potentially counteracted, at
least for some employers.
A. The Automatic Nature of Stereotypes and the Potential for Control
Wilson and Brekke have described the operation of automatic
They define mental
stereotypes as “mental contamination.” 248
contamination as “the process whereby a person ends with an unwanted
judgment, emotion, or behavior because of mental processing that is
unconscious or uncontrollable (again, ‘unwanted’ in the sense that the
judgment maker would prefer not to be influenced by the mental
processes in question).” 249 This automatic nature of stereotypes has
been identified by other researchers as well. 250 Automatic stereotypes
differ from conscious prejudices in that the decision-maker is not aware
of their activation during the decision-making process.
Automatic stereotypes can operate in a number of different ways.
Stereotypes can affect the way we “perceive, store and remember
information.” 251 For example, stereotypes about a certain group
engender certain expectations about that group. This can affect
perception of certain information in the following way: individuals are
more likely to take in information that conforms to their expectations of
a certain group—expectations caused by a stereotype they hold—than
information that conflicts with those expectations. Thus, individuals are
more likely to be attentive to stereotype-confirming behavior in others
than to behavior that contradicts such stereotypes. This phenomenon is
known as the confirmation bias. 252 This may be problematic in the
employment context when a decision-maker, holding certain
expectations about race or gender, seeks out the behavior of individuals
in these groups in order to confirm their expectation. For example,
assume that the supervisor in the White case discussed in Part I had an
248. Wilson & Brekke, supra note 15, at 118.
249. Id. at 119.
250. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 27, at 242 (noting that “[p]eople may often not be aware of what
they are doing . . . the operation of stereotypes and prejudice may be outside of their control”); John A.
Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 363 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999)
(tracing the emergence of the automatic stereotype theory); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6–7
(1989) (discussing the possibility of inhibiting automatic stereotypes); Fiske, supra note 15, at 357
(explaining that stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination have automatic aspects as well as “socially
pragmatic aspects” which serve to sustain them).
251. Page, supra note 58, at 160.
252. See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 238
(1993).
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expectation, stemming from a stereotype, that African-American
employees are less competent than Caucasian employees. Cognitive
research indicates that the supervisor, in writing White’s evaluation,
would be more likely to search out information that confirms White’s
incompetency and disregard information that contradicts that
expectation. Additionally, psychological research has also shown that
the supervisor may tend to employ the fundamental attribution error in
order to retain the consistency of his expectations. The fundamental
attribution error is the “overreadiness to explain behavior in terms of
dispositional factors,” as opposed to situational factors. 253 In other
words, the supervisor above would likely interpret any acts of
incompetence by White as a product of his disposition (i.e., his general
incompetence), and ignore any situational factors that may have
contributed to these actions. Moreover, actors are more likely to
attribute their own behavior and that of those in their in-group to
situational factors, whereas these same actors are more likely to attribute
the actions of members of their out-group to dispositional factors. 254
Additionally, ambiguous information is likely to be interpreted
differently dependent upon one’s expectations as influenced by the
stereotypes one holds. 255
Expectations have also been shown to influence one’s memory about
another individual. 256 Just as one tends to seek out information that
confirms one’s expectations, one also tends to better remember
expectation-consistent information. 257 Again, in the White case, this
translates to the supervisor’s tendency to better remember White’s less
competent acts when evaluating him.
The question is whether these automatic stereotypes can be controlled
in some way by the decision-maker himself. The research indicates that
under certain conditions they can be controlled. Although most agree
that it is difficult for these automatic stereotypes to be controlled, there
is also agreement that it is possible if certain conditions are met.
Specifically, researchers have found that the effects of the automatic
stereotypes can be controlled by the decision-maker if: (1) the decisionmaker is aware of the unconscious stereotype’s operation; and (2) the
decision-maker is motivated to do something about it. 258 For instance,
253. Id. at 180.
254. See id. at 181.
255. See Heilman & Haynes, supra note 48, at 130 (“One of the most robust findings in the
expectancy literature is that expectations can exert a substantial impact on how information is
interpreted, particularly when information is ambiguous . . . .”).
256. Id. at 131.
257. Id.
258. See Bargh, supra note 250, at 371; Blair, supra note 27, at 247–48; Fiske, supra note 15, at

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

47

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3
PEDERSEN FINAL FORMAT 2

144

2/11/2011 3:45:55 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

one study found that in completing the IAT, discussed supra Part II,
“White participants exhibited significantly less automatic negativity
toward Blacks in the presence of a Black experimenter than in the
presence of a White experimenter.” 259 Additionally, when the AfricanAmerican experimenter instructed subjects to “be the least prejudiced
you can” subjects produced lower levels of automatic prejudice. 260 It is
important to remember that the IAT is based on implicit associations
between positive and negative words and African-American and
Caucasian and thus, measures implicit, not explicit bias. As Blair
concludes, “highly motivated individuals can modify the automatic
operation of stereotypes and prejudice.” 261
Aside from context-specific motivators, studies have also shown that
decision-makers who are told to try to suppress their use of stereotypes
can alter the effects of automatic stereotypes. 262 For instance, as
Kawakami, Dovidio, Mill, Hermsen and Russin demonstrated:
[P]articipants who had been trained to say “no” to stereotypic events and
“yes” to nonstereotypic events produced significantly lower levels of
automatic stereotypes, compared to that produced by participants who had
received no training or who had been trained to affirm the stereotypes. In
addition, this “stereotype negation” training was successful in moderating
automatic stereotypes of skinheads and automatic race stereotypes . . . . 263

The key to suppression strategies is that the goal of suppression must be
“accompanied by a specific implementation intention”—e.g., to judge
others fairly. 264
Additionally, the promotion of counter-stereotypes may also
ameliorate the effect of automatic stereotypes. For instance, a study by
Blair, Ma, and Lenton, which asked subjects to create and think about
the mental image of a counter-stereotype (e.g., the strong woman) for
five minutes, was found to reduce the measure of subjects’ automatic
gender stereotypes. 265
Additionally, a study by Dasgupta and
Greenwald found that exposure to pictures or video of admired African391.
259. Blair, supra note 27, at 247 (summarizing Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on
Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842 (2001)).
260. Id.
261. Id. Blair also provides a very useful summary table of research on the malleability of
automatic stereotypes and the results. Id. at 245–46. These studies support the contention that
stereotypes are malleable and can be controlled if certain conditions (e.g., motivation on the part of the
decision-maker) exist.
262. Id. at 248.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 249.
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Americans and disliked Caucasian Americans, was found to reduce
subjects’ automatic stereotypes towards African-Americans. 266
In the employment context specifically, Heilman and Haynes note:
Of relevance is a substantial body of research documenting motivation as
an important factor in the application of stereotypes. Specifically, the
tendency to rely on stereotype-based expectations can give way to more
controlled and reasoned thought processes when the evaluator is strongly
motivated to make accurate judgments. This is likely to occur when: (1)
the evaluator is in an interdependent relationship with the evaluated such
that his or her outcomes rely on the accuracy of the evaluation; or (2) the
evaluator knows that he or she is going to have to account to others for
the decisions made. In either of these instances, the influence of
stereotype-based expectations on evaluations may well be tempered.
....
. . . [E]vidence that being held accountable makes individuals take
action and exhibit behaviors (such as being more attentive when
observing performance and taking more extensive notes when gathering
information) that better prepares them to justify their ratings, which in
turn produces more accurate evaluative judgments. These activities can
reduce, and perhaps even eliminate, the influence of stereotype-based
performance expectations on evaluations . . . . 267

Interestingly, Russell Fazio, the creator of the MODE model of
attitude-behavior processes, concluded, along with his co-author, that
motivation is a function of the perceived costliness of judgmental
error. 268 That is, the more a decision-maker fears that his decisionmaking will be perceived as wrong and possibly prejudiced, the more
motivated the decision-maker is to avoid the influence of bias on his
decision-making.
Thus, this research suggests that the combination of awareness by the
decision-maker of the implicit stereotypes as well as motivation to
eliminate them can lead to a reduction in the effect of automatic
stereotypes. In the context of employment discrimination, this means
that a decision-maker may be able to avoid the effect of implicit bias on
his or her decisions if these two factors are present.

266. Id.
267. Heilman & Haynes, supra note 48, at 140–42 (internal citations omitted).
268. Russell H. Fazio & Tamara Towles-Schwen, The MODE Model of Attitude-Behavior
Processes, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 114 (Shelly Chaicken & Yaacov Trope
eds., 1999).
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B. The Motivating Factor Framework’s Potential for Controlling
Automatic Stereotypes
The remaining question is what, if any effect, can the motivating
factor framework have on the use of automatic stereotypes by
employers? The answer is potentially a potent one. As previously
discussed and demonstrated by the matched cases analysis, the
motivating factor analysis places a very low burden on plaintiffs at the
summary judgment stage of litigation to produce some evidence that an
illegitimate motive was part of the reason for the adverse employment
decision made against plaintiff. As demonstrated by the matched case
analysis, in the circuits where the motivating factor framework is used at
summary judgment, more cases could potentially go to trial (or at least
be settled on their way). Thus, employers will likely be more concerned
with the motives of decision-makers within their firms. Therefore,
employers, and particularly employer’s counsel, will demand that
employers attempt to understand and document their thought processes
at the time the employment decision is made.
Employment is an area of law particularly accustomed to the role of
lawyers as counselors and litigators. For example, many large corporate
defense firms, as part of their services in the employment field, offer
seminars to their client’s employees about proper workplace conduct,
criteria for decision-making processes, or contents of employee
handbooks. 269 It is not uncommon for a supervisor to call corporate
counsel before making an adverse employment decision in order to
ensure that he or she will not be inviting meritorious litigation with the
decision. The area of sexual harassment law is particularly illustrative.
In two cases decided on the same day, the Supreme Court ruled that an
employer is subject to vicarious liability for the harassment of an
employee that does not result in tangible action by that employee’s
269. See, e.g., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Labor and Employment Law,
http://www.skadden.com/default.cfm (follow “Practices” hyperlink; then follow “Labor and
Employment Law” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 16, 2009) (noting that the firm “[a]ssist[s] clients in
identifying and avoiding employment-related problems before they occur, including through use of
internal employment audits”); Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Employment Counseling & Litigation,
http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm (follow “practices” hyperlink; then follow “D-E” hyperlink;
then follow “Employment Counseling & Litigation” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (noting that
the firm conducts “company-wide and management training on a variety of topics, including workplace
harassment, diversity, and EEO compliance”); Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Labor and Employment
Litigation, http://www.sullcrom.com/ (follow “More Practices” hyperlink; then follow “Labor and
Employment Litigation” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 16, 2009) (noting that the firm advises clients with
respect to routine and complex discrimination and other employment-related issues); Ballard Spahr LLP,
Labor and Employment, http://www.ballardspahr.com/PracticeAreas/Practices/LaborEmployment (last
visited Jan. 16, 2009) (noting that the firm offers “[d]ay-to-day counseling on hiring, firing and other
labor and employment law issues”).
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supervisor, but could avoid such liability if the employer could show: (1)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly
correct the harassing behavior; and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to otherwise avoid harm. 270 As a result of these decisions,
corporate counsel regularly conducts training sessions on what it means
for the employer to exercise reasonable care and promptly correct the
behavior as well as on what corrective opportunities the employer
should have in place for employees to use should they need them. 271
Former colleagues, who represent corporate clients confirmed that they
spend at least as much of their time counseling and training their clients’
employees about how to avoid employment discrimination litigation as
they spend actually defending such litigation.
Another area where doctrine has been quickly incorporated into
practice involves the contractual nature of employee handbooks. At one
time, employers believed they could provide employees with a
handbook detailing the employers’ procedures and practices, but simply
disclaim any intent to be contractually bound, rendering the practices
and policies unenforceable. In most jurisdictions considering the issue,
courts have held that this was not the case. 272 Rather, the courts require
that the disclaimer must be in a place likely to be perceived by the
employee and in language likely to be understood. 273 After such
decisions throughout the United States, it has become standard for
employers to incorporate prominent, plain-English disclaimers. 274 Such
change is obviously a result of the interpretation of law to practice by an
employer’s attorneys.
Thus, in a circuit that uses the motivating factor framework, one can
imagine employment counsel attempting to delineate to employers what
process should be undertaken by the decision-maker, as they do in the
instances of sexual harassment or employment handbooks. In a
jurisdiction such as the Ninth Circuit, this would likely include an
270. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
271. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 961 (1999) (noting the role of
defense attorneys in counseling employers so as not to run afoul of the law); Scott A. Moss & Peter H.
Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics
Can Survive the Demise of the “Rational Actor,” 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 247 (2009) (noting that
when evaluating harassment prevention programs, courts look only to the formalities of the programs).
This, in turn, reinforces an employer’s incentive to incorporate legal doctrine into its policies.
272. See Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Subjective Approach to Contracts?: How Courts
Interpret Employee Handbook Disclaimers, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 101, 107 (2008).
273. Id. at 108.
274. Id.
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examination of the manager’s actual reasons for the decision. Perhaps a
manager would even be required by company policy to write down the
reasons he or she would use to justify the decision should the affected
employee decide to bring suit. While such a requirement may have little
effect upon the knowingly biased manager, cognitive research indicates
the potential effect that such requirements could have on those holding
an implicit bias. If the effects of automatic stereotypes can be countered
by the decision-maker’s awareness of the stereotype and the decisionmaker’s motivation to do something about it, then requiring a
managerial employee to articulate his or her reasons for making an
adverse employment decision could help counter any role that implicit
bias may play in employment decisions.
Additionally, outside counsel, while conducting anti-discrimination
training designed to provide guidance for those in circuits using the
motivating factor framework, is likely to remind decision-makers of the
importance of avoiding the use of race, sex, or other prohibited
characteristics in the decision-making process. One can imagine counsel
repeatedly advising clients that adverse employment decisions
absolutely cannot be motivated by race or any other prohibited class
categorization. While such training will likely be aimed at the conscious
discriminator, it is actually more likely to have an effect on the
unconscious discriminator. While the conscious discriminator will
simply make a list of all the pretextual reasons motivating a decision,
when the unconscious discriminator makes her list with counsel’s
warning about avoiding race or sex-based decisions resonating in the
background, that decision-maker may actually uncover the fact that such
prohibited considerations had been playing a role in the decision.
As discussed supra, in Part VI.A, such awareness, coupled with
motivation to stem implicit bias, is a key factor in mitigating the effects
of such bias. In the employment setting, once the awareness is present,
the motivation to avoid the effects of implicit bias would be supplied by
concern over a lawsuit. 275 As noted above, Fazio and Towles-Schwen
found that motivation was a function of the perceived costliness of an
error in judgment. For instance, the authors discussed an experiment in
which “[m]otivation to reach a valid decision was manipulated by
275. Although such warnings are a step towards rooting out implicit bias, they may not be the
most productive way of going about it. Although not the topic of this Article, social psychology
research seems to demonstrate that negative reinforcements about what criteria decision-makers should
not be using is not as effective as other measures. Therefore, counsel and employers should be
searching for the most effective ways to use “motivating factor” training to actually root out implicit
bias. For instance, employers may require their decision-makers to think about counter-stereotypes
before making an employment decision or even watch some type of video about implicit bias and ways
to counteract it.
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enhancing fear of invalidity for half the participants.” 276 Specifically,
the participants were asked to evaluate two department stores. The first
store was described in a generally positive way, although the comments
about its camera department were negative. The second store was
described in a more negative way, but there were positive statements
about its camera department. The participants were then asked to decide
where they would choose to buy a camera. The participants were told
that their score selections would be compared to those of the other
students participating in the session, and that they would have to explain
their decisions to the experimenter and the other participants. The
results of this and other similar experiments demonstrated that motivated
individuals with sufficient opportunity to reflect tended to rely on more
deliberative and less automatic processes in making their judgments.
Thus, the motivated individuals did not simply rely on their overall
attitude toward each store, but rather “engage[d] in the more effortful
processing of retrieving and evaluating their beliefs about the camera
department of the two stores…” 277
These findings highlight the potential impact that the motivating
factor framework can have. If more cases make it past summary
judgment and are able to be evaluated by a factfinder, decision-makers
will feel pressure to make decisions that will comport with the
factfinders’ ultimate decisions. In other words, they will be motivated to
make less prejudiced decisions in order to avoid the situation where the
factfinder evaluates their decision and determines that it is biased.
Additionally, the findings could have implications for the internal
operation of companies. If motivation can be increased through the
perceived cost of judgmental error, there seems to be an argument for
firms to employ multiple, independent decision-makers for each
employment decision, whose decisions can be compared to each other.
This would increase motivation for each decision-maker to examine
their reasons and ensure that prejudice is not playing a role in order to
avoid seeming prejudiced in comparison to their counterparts.
The motivating factor framework, with its emphasis on whether bias
was a reason and not the reason for an employment decision, gives an
incentive for employers to require their employees to self-examine their
motives before acting upon them in the employment context. Thus, not
only will the motivating factor framework potentially result in more
short-term victories for plaintiffs by allowing potentially meritorious
cases to surmount a summary judgment challenge, it will also have a

276. Fazio & Towles-Schwen, supra note 268, at 101.
277. Id.
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more lasting effect as it could prevent decision-makers from unwittingly
basing their decisions on unconscious bias by forcing them to examine
their reasons ex ante. By adopting the motivating framework, courts
will, in the short-run, experience an increase in their employment
discrimination litigation loads. However, in the long-term, caseloads
could actually decrease as employers work to curb the problem of
subconscious bias in-house through employment policies targeted at
self-examination by decision-makers.
While some may be concerned that adopting the motivating factor
framework at summary judgment would lead employers to be worried
that they will never be able to win a motion for summary judgment
because courts will likely find that discrimination could have played a
role, no matter how small, in the manager’s decision. However, the
Supreme Court in Desert Palace specifically allowed for motivating
factor instructions to be given at the jury phase of a trial that is based on
either circumstantial or direct evidence of discrimination. Thus, the
Court envisioned that an employer in either type of case could be held
liable even if discrimination was only partly responsible for its
employment decision.
Second, and more importantly, if an employer is held liable for
employment discrimination in a mixed-motive case, the employer will
be relieved of compensatory damages, punitive damages and backpay if
the employer can prove that it would have made the same decision, even
absent the discriminatory reason. 278 Thus, even if a plaintiff can prove
that discrimination played a part in the decision, the employer can avoid
monetary damages by demonstrating that it would have made the same
decision regardless of discrimination. Thus, allowing the motivating
factor analysis to be used at summary judgment does not necessarily
mean that an employer will face certain damages. In contrast, the
employer will have to demonstrate its decision-making process such that
it can show that the discriminatory reason did not play a defining role in
the decision.
Additionally, not every plaintiff, who has proceeded under the
motivating factor framework in the Ninth Circuit, has been successful in
surmounting a summary judgment motion. For instance, in Sellie v.
Boeing Co., 279 the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to raise
a triable issue of fact as to whether his age resulted in his termination. 280
In that case, plaintiff, an admittedly capable employee of Boeing, was

278. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West 2010).
279. 253 F. App’x 626 (9th Cir. 2007).
280. Id. at 627.
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terminated as part of a reduction in force by the company. 281 He alleged
that he was taken out of numerical order for the reduction in force and
was terminated because of his age. 282 He also offered evidence of
discriminatory remarks about age that were made by two supervisors
during the reduction in force. 283 The Ninth Circuit held that, even if
analyzed under the motivating factor framework, plaintiff had not
adduced enough evidence that discrimination played a role in the actual
decision to terminate and affirmed the district court’s award of summary
judgment for the employer. 284
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit allows the parties to choose whether to
proceed under a single or mixed motive framework. 285 Thus, plaintiffs,
who feel that they have a particularly strong case or those who do not
want to risk being barred from recovery of monetary damages, may still
proceed under McDonnell Douglas and face a higher barrier at summary
judgment. However, because the employer will not know which
framework an aggrieved employee may choose, it will be forced to make
employment decisions as if it will have to confront the motivating factor
standard on summary judgment. As noted earlier, this will give the
decision-maker the motivation to identify and try to counter any
automatic stereotypes, even if ex post the employer is not subjected to a
lower threshold at summary judgment via the motivating framework
analysis.
Finally, some may wonder why the framework under which a
disparate treatment claim can be brought has to change in order to
counteract implicit bias. Is it not enough to increase the potential
damages, for example? While increasing the available damages to
plaintiffs would increase the potential liability of employers and thus
force employers to pay a bit more attention to their decision-making
processes, this solution does not go far enough. Increased damages
within the McDonnell Douglas framework still allow an employer to
avoid summary judgment by articulating a legitimate reason and forcing
a plaintiff to demonstrate that discrimination was the reason. As

281. Id.
282. Id. at 628.
283. Id. at 627.
284. Id. at 628. The court noted that it assumed without deciding that the mixed motive
framework applies to discrimination statutes other than Title VII. Id. This issue has now been decided
by the Supreme Court. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
In Adam v. Kempthorne, 292 F. App’x 646 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 52
(2009), the court also affirmed the district court grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer,
finding that there was no evidence that age was a factor at all in the employer’s decision. Id. at 649–
650. See also Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640–41 (9th Cir. 2003).
285. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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discussed in Part III, supra, such a framework does not recognize the
complexities of the decision-making process. Furthermore, increased
damages within the McDonnell Douglas framework would not lead to
greater focus by the decision-maker on all of the reasons contributing to
a decision. Rather, the employer will simply reinforce to the decisionmaker how important it is to have a single documented reason for the
decision. Thus, the decision-maker will still lack the motivation to
become aware of unconscious bias and do something to change it.
In sum, the adoption of at least the election of proceeding under the
motivating framework analysis at the summary judgment phase of
employment discrimination cases will operate indirectly on employer’s
decision-makers motivating them to scrutinize their decisions and the
reasons for those decisions before making them. This motivation can
potentially counter such decision-maker’s implicit biases. In this way,
the law, although not able to directly root out such bias, will provide
incentives for employers to do so, which can help mitigate the damage
such implicit biases may have. This will, in turn, lead to the furtherance
of the goal of Title VII—to eliminate employment decisions made
because of a protected characteristic.
VII. CONCLUSION
As researchers discover more about the nature of implicit bias and the
potential ways in which it operates to unknowingly influence
individuals’ decision-making processes, the law of employment
discrimination needs to help counteract this phenomenon. Specifically,
Title VII’s mandate to eliminate discrimination because of an
individual’s race, sex, religion, or national origin, seems to encompass at
least the vision of eradicating all forms of discrimination from the
workplace—both explicit and implicit. In order to help further this goal,
this Article posits that the motivating factor framework should at least
be available to a plaintiff at the summary judgment stage of all
individual disparate treatment cases pursued under Title VII. The
availability of this framework will lead to an increase in the number of
such cases that proceed to trial. However, this should also lead to
employers requiring managerial employees to closely scrutinize all
reasons for their decisions before proceeding with an adverse
employment decision. 286 Such a mandate will provide such employees
with the motivation they need to counteract their own automatic

286. In future work, I plan to undertake an empirical analysis of what employers in the Ninth
Circuit are actually doing in response to the Desert Palace decision.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/3

56

Bucciarelli Pedersen: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNCOVERING IMPLICIT BIAS
PEDERSEN FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 3:45:55 PM

UNCOVERING IMPLICIT BIAS

153

stereotypes. Thus, the law can indirectly aid decision-makers in
counteracting the effects of their own implicit biases.
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